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INTRODUCTION
Seemingly benign questions of statutory interpretation sometimes reveal
important insights about the meaning of the law. A famous example is the “No
Vehicles in the Park” hypothetical.1 Is a person driving an emergency vehicle
in the park intending to save the life of an accident victim violating the ordinance? Answering the question requires interpreting the plain language meaning and intent of the ordinance: does the term of art “car” include an “emergency vehicle?” Does the ordinance intend to ensure the safety of park visitors,
such that it makes sense to exempt from its application an emergency vehicle
driven in circumstances meant to save a life because the purpose of the ordinance is pursued?2 Notably, addressing these inquires entails a lot more than
mastering the tools of statutory interpretation. Rather, the questions tease out
complex insights about the difference between bright-line rules and open-ended
standards as well as jurisprudential choices between formalism with its vision
of law as a closed, self-contained independent system, and realism and its
commitment to paying attention to context and an understanding of law as a
dynamic ever-evolving system.3
In-house pay, and specifically, whether in-house salaries, bonuses, stock
grants, stock options, and nonmonetary benefits are a “fee” subject to a reasonableness requirement,4 turns out to be yet another example of an ostensibly be* Charles W. Delaney Jr. Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I
thank Arthur Best, John Bliss, Bruce Green, Sung Hui Kim, Russ Pearce, Ellyn Rosen, Steve
Pepper, Joyce Sterling, Steven Vaughan, Brad Wendel, and David Wilkins for their comments and Diane Burkhardt, Faculty Services Liaison at the Westminster Law Library at the
University of Denver Sturm College of Law for her outstanding research assistance.
1 H. L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593,
607 (1958). The hypothetical has been referred to as “the most famous hypothetical in the
common law world.” Frederick Schauer, A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park, 83 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1109, 1109 (2008), and the “chestnut of legal debates about statutory interpretation.”; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications for
Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235, 1255 (2015).
2 For a similar formulation, see Richard A. Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, NEW
REPUBLIC (Aug. 23, 2012), https://newrepublic.com/article/106441/scalia-garner-reading-the
-law-textual-originalism [https://perma.cc/S9HW-UUPD]. (“Does an ordinance that says that
‘no person may bring a vehicle into the park’ apply to an ambulance that enters the park to
save a person’s life?”).
3 See Hart, supra note 1, at 606–08.
4 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) holds that attorneys’
fees are subject to a reasonableness requirement. It states in relevant part: “[a] lawyer shall
not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee . . . .” Id. A vast majority
of U.S. jurisdictions have adopted Rule 1.5(a). See AM. BAR ASS’N CPR POLICY
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nign question of statutory interpretation, which reveals important insights about
the meaning of law, law practice and the future of attorney regulation. Construing the plain language meaning of the word “fee” and the various rationales for
the traditional reasonableness requirement imposed on attorneys’ fees in the
context of in-house practice teases out important insights about the evolving
regulation and role of in-house counsel and lawyers more generally.
Moreover, understanding in-house pay entails delving into the rise of a
class of lawyer-employees, of which in-house lawyers are but a small subset,
and unearthing regulatory tensions and questions “at the intersection of judicial
power over the practice of law and legislative power over the conditions of employment.”5 These questions include whether the judiciary or the legislature
should regulate lawyers and whether all lawyers should be subject to the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (Rules). Understanding in-house pay also necessitates acknowledging the emergence of lawyer-businesspersons, of which inhouse counsel are but one example, for whom law is not the core of what they
do but only a part of their roles and job descriptions. Together, the lawyeremployee and the lawyer-businessperson models challenge the long-standing
dominant paradigm of the lawyer-professional, the foundation of law practice,
and the regulation of lawyers as we know them.
This Article is organized as follows. Part I offers, for the first time, a statutory interpretation of the Rules that impose a reasonableness requirement on
attorneys’ fees in the context of in-house pay. Following a thorough analysis of
the meaning, intent, and various rationales of intersecting rules, it concludes
that in-house pay is subject to the traditional reasonableness requirement imposed on fees, and then offers a comprehensive analysis of the meaning of reasonableness as applied to in-house counsel.
The rest of the Article explores the consequences and meaning of this novel interpretation for in-house lawyers, the profession and the Rules. Part II examines the rise of the lawyer-employee paradigm, of which in-house lawyers
are a subset. It shows that while in-house counsel are employees and therefore
part and parcel of the new lawyer-employees class, they are, importantly, powerful employees, more akin to income partners and law firm associates, as opposed to the more typical weak lawyer-employee paradigm, exemplified by
staff, temporary, and outsourced lawyers. It concludes that as powerful employees, in-house lawyers should be subject to regulations applicable to lawyerprofessionals, such as the reasonableness requirement imposed on in-house
pay; but that in general, the Rules ought to be carefully scrutinized before they
are applied to the new class of weak lawyer-employees.

IMPLEMENTATION COMM., VARIATIONS OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT, RULE 1.5: FEES (2018), available at https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/a
ba/administrative/professional_responsibility/mrpc_1_5.pdf [https://perma.cc/82W6-GXR7].
5 Chism v. Tri-State Constr., Inc., 374 P.3d 193, 214 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016) (Chism was the
first case in the U.S. to examine whether in-house pay is subject to a reasonableness requirement).
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Part III explores in-house lawyers as an example of lawyerbusinesspersons. It shows that similar to the rise of the lawyer-employee, the
emergence of the lawyer-businessperson model raises important questions
about the future of the regulation of the legal profession, as well as the regulation of nonlawyers who provide legal services. Finally, the Conclusion explains
why the rise of the lawyer-employee paradigm and the emergence of the lawyer-businessperson model as alternatives to the dominant lawyer-professional
ideal are important developments not only for in-house counsel and lawyers
generally but to nonlawyers as well, including clients, legal service providers,
and the public.
I.

REGULATING IN-HOUSE PAY AS A (COMPLEX) DOCTRINAL QUESTION

Rule 1.5(a) states in relevant part: “[a] lawyer shall not make an agreement
for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee . . . .”6 Does in-house pay, including
salary, bonuses, stock grants and options, and nonmonetary benefits, constitute
a “fee” subject to a reasonableness requirement of Rule 1.5(a)?
A. Reasonableness: Attorneys’ Fees and In-House Pay
In Chism v. Tri-State Construction Inc.7, a Washington state court of appeals confronted the issue for the first time.8 In the case, Mr. Chism, Tri-State
Construction Inc.’s (Tri-State) general counsel, sued Tri-State for breach of
compensation contracts to recover allegedly unpaid bonuses.9 Tri-State counterclaimed, asserting that Mr. Chism’s compensation contracts violated the
Washington Rules of Professional Conduct (Wash. RPC) and were void as
against public policy.10 Specifically, Tri-State argued inter alia that the compensation contracts violated Wash. RPC Rules 1.5 and 1.8 because they were
unreasonable.11
The trial court found that Tri-State breached the compensation contracts
and willfully withheld Mr. Chism’s bonuses,12 and dismissed Tri-State’s Rule
1.5 counterclaim.13 However, the trial court held that Mr. Chism violated Rules
1.7 and 1.8 in part because the bonuses in question were unreasonable, and disgorged more than half of his unpaid bonuses.14 The court of appeals avoided
the substantive question of whether in-house pay is subject to a reasonableness
6

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).
Chism, 374 P.3d at 207.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 202.
10 Id.
11 See id. Tri-State also argued that the compensation packages violated Washington Rules
of Professional Conduct Rules 1.7 and 1.8 because they gave rise to prohibited conflicts of
interest. Id. at 207, 209.
12 Id. at 202.
13 Id. at 202, 206.
14
Id. at 203.
7
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requirement, reversing the disgorgement on two procedural grounds.15 First, the
appellate court held that the Washington Supreme Court’s disciplinary authority over Washington attorneys is “plenary.”16 Because the issue of the reasonableness of in-house pay was a matter of first impression for the Washington
Supreme Court, the trial court lacked the authority to discipline Mr. Chism and
disgorge his bonuses.17 Second and relatedly, because the construction of the
Wash. RPC with regard to in-house pay was novel, the rules were vague and
their interpretation would only apply prospectively, that is, they could not retroactively apply to Mr. Chism’s conduct.18 Thus, the fundamental substantive
issue—whether in-house pay is subject to a reasonableness requirement—has
remained undecided.
1. The Plain Language of Rule 1.5(a)’s Reasonableness Requirement
Like the rules in a vast majority of the states, Wash. RPC Rule 1.5(a) follows Rule 1.5(a) of the Rules and states in relevant part that “[a] lawyer shall
not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee.”19 Rule
1.5(a) thus imposes a mandatory reasonableness requirement on lawyers’ fees.
Does the term of art “fee” in rule 1.5(a) encompass in-house pay, including salaries, bonuses, stock grants, stock options, and nonmonetary benefits?
In Chism, Tri-State made this very claim. The trial court dismissed the
claim at the summary judgment stage, finding that as a matter of law a “fee”
was different than “wages” and “bonuses,” and that accordingly Rule 1.5(a)’s
reasonableness requirement did not apply to in-house pay. It concluded that
“[Mr. Chism’s] status as in house counsel renders the disgorgement of fees . . .
based on alleged violations of RPC 1.5 unavailable. . . .”20 The court of appeals
affirmed. Following the conventions of judicial interpretation of statutory language, it held that “[w]hen interpreting the meaning of any RPC, . . . [o]ur goal
is to give effect to the intent behind the rule, which we discern, where possible,
from the plain language of the rule at issue in the context of the RPCs as a
whole.”21 Construing the intent behind Rule 1.5(a), the court of appeals looked
to the plain language meaning of the word “fee” and held that “Tri-State’s argument equivocates between ‘fees,’ the explicit object of the rule, and ‘wages,’
the type of compensation here at issue. This is contrary to the plain meaning
and common usage of the words.”22
With due respect to the Chism courts, the interpretive issue here is much
more complex than they acknowledged it to be as neither the Rules, nor the Re15

Id. at 215.
Id. at 205.
17 Id. at 208–09.
18 Id. at 206, 209.
19 Compare WASH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(a) (2015), with MODEL RULES
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).
20 Chism, 374 P.3d at 207 (internal citations omitted).
21 Id. (internal citations omitted).
22
Id.
16
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statement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers (2000) (Restatement), define
the term “fee.” On the one hand, the word “fee” is not identical to “compensation”, “wages,” “salary,” “bonus,” “stock grant,” “stock option,” or “nonmonetary benefits.” Moreover, as noted by the Chism court of appeals, the common
usage of these terms is not identical because “fees” tend to suggest payment for
legal services by a client in an attorney-client professional relationship, whereas the other terms imply payment for services by an employer in an employeeemployer relationship.23 Yet this seemingly clear distinction begs the question
here, where the client is an employer and the lawyer is an employee.
Relatedly, perhaps the court of appeals meant to invoke the classic agency
law distinction between independent contractors and employees,24 suggesting
that “fees” denote payment for the former whereas the other terms of art reflect
payment to the latter. This distinction too, however, is unhelpful in the context
of in-house lawyers. In a traditional independent contractor-principal relationship, the principal controls only the objectives of the relationship; whereas in
an employer-employee relationship the employer controls both the objectives
and the manner in which they are to be pursued by the employee.25 This legal
definition, however, does not fit the practice realities of in-house lawyers:
while they are certainly employees of their entity-clients, in-house lawyeremployees exercise ample control over the manner in which they represent
their clients, and the entity-client-employers do not purport to control the manner in which their in-house lawyers practice law on their behalf.26 In this sense,
in-house lawyers, although technically employees, resemble independent contractors who exercise control over the manner in which they pursue their tasks.
Thus, defining fees to denote the compensation of independent contractors such
as outside counsel and the other terms of art to refer to the compensation of
employees such as in-house lawyers begs the question.
On the other hand, a standard definition of attorneys’ fees is “the payment
for legal services,”27 and in-house pay, both a salary and overall compensation,
is clearly a payment for legal services.28 Furthermore, the Restatement states
23

Id. at n.22.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (AM. LAW INST. 2006); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
25 See, e.g., Hoover v. Sun Oil Co., 212 A.2d 214, 214–16 (Del. Super. Ct. 1965); Humble
Oil & Ref. Co. v. Martin, 222 S.W.2d 995, 998 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1949); Murphy v. Holiday
Inns, Inc., 219 S.E.2d 874, 875, 878 (Va. Sup. Ct. 1975).
26 As Sung Hui Kim has shown, rather than directly control the manner in which their inhouse lawyers practice, entity clients put in place an “ethical ecology” introducing obedience, alignment and conformity pressures intended to incentivize in-house counsel to act as
“mere employee[s],” “faithful agent[s]” and “team player[s].” See Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983,
1001, 1008, 1019, 1034 (2005) [hereinafter Kim, The Banality of Fraud].
27 Attorney’s Fee, FREEDICTIONARY.COM, https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com
/Attorney+fee [https://perma.cc/EY2V-8RFC] (last visited Sept. 15, 2019).
28 Notably, most definitions list as examples of fees hourly, flat, contingency, statutory,
court-approved and combinations of these arrangements, and not salary or compensation.
See id.
24
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that “[t]he prohibition on unreasonable payment arrangements is not limited to
fees in a narrow sense,”29 and appears to construe “fees” broadly as a synonym
of compensation, for example, by noting that “[t]his Section forbids unlawful
fees and unreasonably large fees, while leaving clients and lawyers free to negotiate a broad range of compensation terms,”30 suggesting that “fees” ought to
be construed broadly enough to encompass salaries and bonuses of lawyeremployees.
Revealingly, the court of appeals’ own textual analysis proves the inherent
ambiguity of the term “fee” as applied to in-house pay. Quoting MerriamWebster’s Dictionary’s definitions of “fee” and “wage,” the court of appeals
reasoned: “[i]n short, ‘wage’ presupposes an ongoing employer-employee relationship, whereas ‘fee’ suggests retaining a professional on a temporary basis
for a specific, limited purpose.”31 Yet, Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary defines a
“fee” as “compensation . . . for professional service,” which applies to in-house
pay; and the court’s reasoning does not resolve the issue: whereas “wage” presupposes an ongoing employer-employee relationship, a “fee” does not necessarily suggest a temporary, limited attorney-client relationship. Rather, some
lawyers charge clients fees while engaged in ongoing, permanent, stable attorney-client relationships.32
The difficulty of discerning the intent of Rule 1.5(a) from its plain language, and, in particular, whether “fee” encompasses in-house pay, is not surprising. The Rules, inclusive of Rule 1.5(a), were adopted in 1983,33 when the
transformation of in-house practice was in its infancy. One “of the most significant changes in corporate legal practice in the United States,”34 indeed, a “striking development,”35 has been the rise to prominence of in-house lawyers, and,
in particular, of general counsel of large entity organizations over the last fifty
years. Once upon a time “castigated,”36 belittled as “house counsel,”37 and per29

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 34, cmt. a. (AM. LAW INST.
2000).
30 Id.
31 Chism v. Tri-State Constr., Inc., 374 P.3d 193, 207 n.22 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).
32 Historically, the typical relationship between large law firms and their large entity clients
used to be ongoing, permanent, and stable. The relatively recent erosion of these permanent
long-term relationships has been a source of great distress for BigLaw; See David B. Wilkins, Team of Rivals? Toward a New Model of the Corporate Attorney-Client Relationship,
78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2067, 2080–84 (2010) [hereinafter Wilkins, Team of Rivals?].
33 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) (Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards Chair’s Introduction) (describing the evolution of Model
Rules of Professional Conduct).
34 Mary C. Daly, The Cultural, Ethical, and Legal Challenges in Lawyering for a Global
Organization: The Role of the General Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1057, 1057 (1997).
35 Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law Firm, 37
STAN. L. REV. 277, 277 (1985).
36 Robert Eli Rosen, The Inside Counsel Movement, Professional Judgment and Organizational Representation, 64 IND. L.J. 479, 479 (1989).
37 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Ethical Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1011,
1011–12 (1997).
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ceived to be lawyers “who had not quite made the grade as partner[s],”38 General counsel now “sit[] close to the top of the corporate hierarchy as [] member[s] of senior management,”39 having gained power, prestige and respect.40
This transformation was beginning to take place in the mid-1970s, and was not
reflected in the Rules.41
In-house pay reflects this profound transformation. Whereas through the
mid-1970s in-house lawyers were paid relatively low salaries reflecting their
low status, their rise to power and influence has corresponded with significantly
higher compensation. For example, in 2017, the average salary of the 100 general counsel with the highest cash compensation was $717,183, the average
overall compensation of these general counsel was $2,028,221, and the highest
paid general counsel brought home $6,948,750.42 Given this profound transformation of in-house pay, it is thus hardly surprising that in the mid to late
1970s when the Rules were being drafted and debated, little attention was given
to the issue. Put differently, legislative history is unhelpful here because at most
it shows not that the American Bar Association (ABA) considered a broad definition of “fees” and rejected it but rather that it did not contemplate the possibility of salaries being a subset of fees. Moreover, the plain language of a rule
must be interpreted in the context of the Rules as a whole,43 which are rules of
reason.44 Accordingly, even if the ABA had considered that possibility, inhouse practice realities have changed so radically between the 1970s and early
1980s and now that such analysis would be outdated.
In any event, given the going rates of in-house pay, the issue of whether it
is subject to reasonableness constraint is both topical and timely. Because the

38

Chayes & Chayes, supra note 35, at 277. Although, as Carl Liggio astutely points out,
BigLaw was hard at work perpetuating this perception. Carl D. Liggio, The Changing Role
of Corporate Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1201, 1203 (1997).
39 Chayes & Chayes, supra note 35, at 277.
40 Hazard, supra note 37, at 1011–12; Rosen, supra note 36, at 479.
41 The American Bar Association formed the Commission on Evaluation of Professional
Standards in 1977 to undertake a comprehensive review of the Model Code, the then applicable rules of professional conduct. The Commission conducted a six-year review and recommended the adoption of the new Model Rules, which the House of Delegates approved in
1983. The in-house transformation was still in its infancy and therefore could not and did not
play any meaningful role in the Commission’s recommendations. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) (Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards
Chair’s Introduction).
42 Caroline Spiezio, The 2018 GC Compensation Survey: A New No. 1, CORP. COUNS. (Aug.
1, 2018), https://www.law.com/corpcounsel/2018/08/01/cc-mag-080118-fea-cover/?slreturn
=20190816011321 [https://perma.cc/ZQB3-3BGE] follow the click through link to: htt
ps://advance.lexis.com/search?crid=fddb70a0-d925-4602-b7e4-738e295c7cbd&pdsearch
terms=LNSDUID-ALMCORPCMgmd45ejgei&pdbypasscitatordocs=False&pdmfid=100
0516&pdisurlapi=true [https://perma.cc/K83H-Q9FN].
43 Chism v. Tri-State Constr., Inc., 374 P.3d 193, 207 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).
44 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, SCOPE cmt. 14 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) (“The Rules of
Professional Conduct are rules of reason. They should be interpreted with reference to the
purposes of legal representation and of the law itself.”).
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plain language of Rule 1.5(a) and its legislative history are not dispositive when
it comes to in-house pay, one must turn to the intent behind the Rule.45
2. The Intent of Rule 1.5(a)’s Reasonableness Requirement
The comments to Rule 1.5 and the Restatement reveal four intersecting rationales for the reasonableness requirement: client protection, increased access
to legal services, professionalism and fiduciary duties.
a.

Client Protection

The Restatement explains that the reasonableness requirement in Rule
1.5(a) is designed to protect clients, and, in particular, vulnerable unsophisticated clients, from lawyer abuse. The Restatement notes: “A client-lawyer fee arrangement will be set aside when its provisions are unreasonable as to the client. . . . Courts are concerned to protect clients, particularly those who are
unsophisticated in matters of lawyers’ compensation, when a lawyer has overreached,”46 and adds: “[i]nformation about fees for legal services is often difficult for prospective clients to obtain. Many clients do not bargain effectively
because of their need and inexperience.”47 This rationale is also reflected in
various statutory provisions imposing limitations on lawyers’ fees meant to
protect vulnerable clients.48
Notably, the client protection rationale does not aim to shield clients from a
few abusive “bad apple” lawyers. Rather, it guards against excesses inherent in
day-to-day interactions between ordinary lawyers and ordinary clients. Clients
seek out lawyers when they have legal needs,49 needs that are often stressful
45

RICHARD EKINS, THE NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT 1–2 (2012) (“[L]egislative intent
has traditionally been thought to be the central object of statutory interpretation.”); WILLIAM
N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 14 (1994) (“Anglo-American
scholars from early modern times to the present have argued that original intent is and
should be the cornerstone of statutory interpretation.”); See Hillel Y. Levin, Contemporary
Meaning and Expectations in Statutory Interpretation, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1103, 1110–11
(noting that proponents of various statutory interpretation schools of thought, including Purposivism and Pragmatism, acknowledge the central role of intent in statutory interpretation).
46 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 34 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST.
2000).
47 Id.
48 Statutory restrictions or caps on attorneys’ fees are common in medical malpractice, veterans’ rights, and workers’ compensation representations, see Sachi Barreiro, How Much
Will a Workers’ Compensation Lawyer Cost?, ALLLAW, https://www.alllaw.com/articles/
nolo/workers-compensation/lawyer-cost-fees.html [https://perma.cc/MC8M-B7EN] (last visited Oct. 14, 2019); Medicaid Liability/Medical Malpractice 2011 Legislation, NAT’L CONF.
ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/medicalliability-or-malpractice-2011-legislation.aspx [https://perma.cc/CJM9-6QH7] (last updated
Aug. 15, 2012); The Fees Which May Be Charged by an Agent or Attorney, NAT’L ORG.
VETERANS’ ADVOCS., INC., https://www.vetadvocates.org/cpages/fees-which-may-be-charge
d-by-agent-attorney [https://perma.cc/Q8P7-3PKS] (last visited Oct. 14, 2019).
49 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 34 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST.
2000).
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and embarrassing. Clients are frequently eager to retain lawyers and address
these problems and are therefore less likely to effectively negotiate with lawyers over fees. This rationale is especially applicable to unsophisticated clients
who in addition to dealing with the stress caused by legal needs are not used to
dealing with lawyers. Moreover, information about fees is not readily available,50 and clients’ inexperience in dealing with lawyers compounds their ineffective fee negotiations. As a result, fee negotiations may regularly result in unreasonable fees but for the objective reasonableness requirement imposed by
Rule 1.5(a).
On a quick read, one may be tempted to promptly dismiss the client protection rationale as inapplicable to entity-clients and their in-house lawyers, and
indeed, the rationale poorly fits a subset of entity clients. Large entity clients
likely do not need the protection of the Rules, because they tend to be sophisticated and have ample information about fees and legal services that they increasingly use to negotiate favorable fee terms vis-à-vis outside and inside
counsel.51 In particular, a large entity client is likely not vulnerable vis-à-vis its
in-house counsel: it has experienced executives negotiating on its behalf, and
often has other in-house lawyers and outside counsel at its service.52 Some midsize entity clients may similarly not be vulnerable to in-house lawyers: a decision to hire an in-house lawyer may follow interactions with outside counsel
and be driven in part by a desire to reduce the cost of legal services, indicating
that the clients are relatively savvy and knowledgeable about in-house pay.53
Yet the kneejerk reaction to overlook the client protection rationale as applied to in-house lawyers ought to be resisted, however, because other entityclients are in need and will benefit from the client protection rationale as evidenced by the facts of Chism. Mr. Chism was an in-house lawyer and general
counsel of Tri-State, having previously served as Tri-State’s outside counsel,
was its source of legal advice and counsel, and the small family entity and its
authorized constituents were arguably vulnerable to him, a claim they explicitly
made in the litigation.54 More generally, many small and mid-size entities may
be unsophisticated in matters of lawyers’ compensation and have little access to
information about in-house salaries or the ability to reasonably analyze it, undercutting their ability to effectively negotiate a reasonable compensation
package. Put differently, while large entity-clients are likely not in need of pro50

Bar associations used to maintain minimum fee schedules, which provided information
about fees, an uncompetitive practice disallowed by the United States Supreme Court in
Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). See Richard Abel, The Transformation of
the American Legal Profession, 20 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 7, 7-12 (1986).
51 See generally Rosen, supra note 36, at 479, 483–84; Wilkins, supra note 32, at 2081–84.
52 Id.
53 David Wilkins dubs this the “economic” claim of the in-house counsel movement, see,
David B. Wilkins, The In-House Counsel Movement, Metrics of Change, LEGAL BUS.
WORLD (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.legalbusinessworld.com/single-post/2017/01/20/The-In
-House-Counsel-Movement-Metrics-of-Change.
54 Chism v. Tri-State Constr., Inc., 374 P.3d 193, 196–201 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016) (Tri-State
argued that Mr. Chism took advantage of its ailing president to obtain his bonuses).
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tection from their in-house counsel, organizational clients are not a monolith.
Using large sophisticated powerful corporations as a proxy for the entire universe of entity-clients to conclude that all entity-clients are not vulnerable to
their in-house counsel and not in need of protection would be simplistic and inaccurate.
The inconclusive nature of the client protection rationale as applied to inhouse lawyers reveals profound insights about contemporary law practice and
its regulation: context matters and traditional hierarchies and boundaries are increasingly being blurred, rendering a universal predictable interpretation of the
Rules a daunting task. To begin with, elite general counsel of large-entity clients have become, over the last fifty years or so, some of the most powerful
lawyers in the legal profession.55 Yet, at the same time, their employers and the
employers’ authorized constituents such as CEOs of Fortune 500 companies are
as, if not more, powerful and sophisticated as their general counsel and do not
need the reasonableness protection of Rule 1.5(a). Thus, ironically and counterintuitively, the most powerful in-house lawyers are likely not in a position to
abuse their clients in the context of pay negotiations. Many other general counsel and in-house lawyers, who may not be as powerful as their elite counterparts, are nonetheless quite powerful vis-à-vis their small entity-clients, which
may benefit from the client protection rationale.56
Thus, it is not necessarily the most powerful in-house counsel that pose the
most threat to their (equally if not more powerful) clients. Rather, it is the
somewhat less powerful in-house lawyers, those practicing in small in-house
legal departments serving small or relatively unsophisticated entity-clients, who
may be able to take advantage of their clients. This mirrors a similar trend outside of the in-house sphere. Whereas BigLaw equity partners are considered
some of the most powerful elite within the legal profession, they represent
some of the most powerful and sophisticated entity clients who can protect their
own interests. In contrast, solo practitioners who within the profession benefit
from lower prestige, tend to exercise greater power and influence vis-à-vis their
individual relatively unsophisticated clients.57
Moreover, the very vulnerability of some corporate entity clients reflects
the blurring of the traditional boundary within the legal profession between the
corporate hemisphere with its powerful and sophisticated entity clients and the
55

Supra notes 34–40 and accompanying text.
On the importance of context and the danger inherent in applying universal assumptions
about the identity of lawyers and their clients to an increasingly diverse legal profession, see
David B. Wilkins, Everyday Practice is the Troubling Case: Confronting Context in Legal
Ethics, in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES 68, 72–74 (Sarat et al. eds. 1998)
[hereinafter Wilkins, Everyday Practice is the Troubling Case].
57 See ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE
LARGE LAW FIRM (1988) (documenting the complex practice realities of large law firm partner who are at the same time powerful within their law firms and the profession but not necessarily vis-à-vis their entity clients); William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones's Case, 50 MD. L. REV. 213, 213, 225 (1991) (examining the dominant
position of seemingly powerless lawyers with respect to their individual clients).
56
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individual hemisphere with its individual vulnerable clients.58 Several trends,
including increased mobility, the rise of information technology, the use of unbundling and repackaging of legal tasks, the deregulation of organizational
forms through which law can be practiced, and globalization have combined to
destabilize the hemispheres, which no longer accurately reflect the complex
practice realities of the twenty-first century.59 The end result is this: one can no
longer simply assume that entity-clients do not need protection from in-house
lawyers or that the most powerful in-house lawyers pose the most threat of negotiating unreasonable pay with their clients. Instead, some entity clients occupying space in the corporate hemisphere may nonetheless be vulnerable vis-àvis their in-house lawyers.
That the client protection rationale applies well to some entity clients and
poorly to others is a function of two interrelated features of in-house practice:
the great range of entity clients in size, needs and organization; and the growing
variety of in-house lawyers, tasks and roles, juxtaposed against the insistence of
the Rules on regulating all in-house counsel, and indeed, all lawyers, with a
one-size-fits-all universal code of conduct.60 The wisdom of this approach notwithstanding,61 as long as it continues to be the prevailing regulatory method
deployed by the ABA, it strongly suggests extending the client protection ra58

On the individual and corporate hemispheres of the legal profession, see JOHN P. HEINZ &
EDWARD O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 319–20
(1982) (finding that the legal profession consists of two categories of lawyers whose practice
settings, socioeconomic and ethno-religious backgrounds, education, and clientele differ
considerably); JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE
BAR 30–31, 44 (2005) (documenting that lawyers work in two fairly distinct hemispheres—
individual and corporate—and that mobility between these hemispheres is relatively limited).
59 David B. Wilkins, Some Realism About Legal Realism for Lawyers: Assessing the Role of
Contest in Legal Ethics, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT
25, 33–38 (Leslie C. Levin & Lynn Mather eds., 2012) [hereinafter Wilkins, Some Realism
About Legal Realism].
60 Universalism has long been a key feature of the regulation of American lawyers. See, e.g.,
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Introduction to AM. BAR ASS’N, A CENTURY OF LEGAL ETHICS:
TRIAL LAWYERS AND THE ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, at xxix (Lawrence J. Fox
et al. eds., 2009) (“Looking back—briefly—at the history of legal ethics governance in the
United States, a number of broad themes emerge . . . [among them] uniform rules or standards applicable to all or most attorneys”). The 1908 ABA Canons of Professional Ethics stated their universal premise explicitly, declaring that: “The canons of the American Bar Association apply to all branches of the legal profession; specialists in particular branches are not
to be considered as exempt from the application of these principles.” STEPHEN GILLERS ET
AL., REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS (2017) (quoting A.B.A., CANONS
OF PROF’L ETHICS, Canon 45 (1963)) (emphasis added). The 1969 ABA Model Code, which
replaced the Canons, similarly stated that: “the Disciplinary Rules should be uniformly applied to all lawyers, regardless of the nature of their professional activities.” MODEL CODE OF
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY PRELIMINARY STATEMENT (AM. BAR ASS’N 1969).
61 Eli Wald, Resizing the Rules of Professional Conduct, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 227, 230,
251–52, 257 (2014) [hereinafter Wald, Resizing the Rules of Professional Conduct] (criticizing the Rules’ one-size-fits-all approach for institutionalizing implicit bias against women
and minority lawyers and calling for the adoption of a regulatory mode sensitive to contemporary practice realities and a diverse legal profession).
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tionale to all clients, including the subset of large and sophisticated entityclients who may not need it. As the Chism and many other courts explain, “the
plain language of the rule at issue” must be interpreted “in the context of the
RPCs as a whole.”62 Given the Rules’ insistence on a one-size-fits-all regulatory approach and their overall objective of client protection,63 in case of some
doubt, or, more accurately, when in the face of growing client and lawyer diverse identities, the Rules may over protect some clients and under protect others, the Rules ought to err on the side of client protection and impose the reasonableness requirement on all attorneys, in-house lawyers included.
b.

Increased Access to Legal Services

Next, the reasonableness requirement of Rule 1.5(a) is explained in terms
of increasing access to legal services: “the availability of legal services is often
essential if people of limited means are to enjoy legal rights. Those seeking to
vindicate their rights through the private bar should not be deterred by the risk
of unwarranted fee burdens.”64 Thus, the Restatement’s increased access to legal services rationale contains two intertwined strands. To increase access to
law and lawyers by people of limited means, “reasonableness” means “low”
fees such that people of limited means can afford them.65 To increase access for
those who seek to vindicate legal rights, “reasonableness” means “warranted”
fees.66 Neither strand applies with force to in-house lawyers.
With regard to the “low” strand of reasonableness, entity clients are generally not of limited means. Even mid and small size entity clients with little
funds in their corporate treasuries do not easily fit into a traditional understanding of “limited means,” which usually references levels of poverty and inability
to pay for legal needs.67 Entity clients, in contrast, have different types of needs
62

See, e.g., LK Operating, LLC v. Collection Grp., LLC, 331 P.3d 1147, 1158 (Wash.
2014); In re Pers. Restraint of Adams, 309 P.3d 451, 454 (Wash. 2013); Chism v. Tri-State
Constr., Inc., 374 P.3d 193, 207 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting LK Operating, LLC v. Collection Grp., LLC, 331 P.3d 1147, 1147); see MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, SCOPE
cmts. 14–15 (AM. BAR ASS’N, 2019) (“The Rules of Professional Conduct are rules of reason. They should be interpreted with reference to the purposes of legal representation and of
the law itself . . . The Rules presuppose a larger legal context shaping the lawyer’s role.”).
63 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, PREAMBLE cmt. 12 (AM. BAR ASS’N, 2019) (“The
profession has a responsibility to assure that its regulations are conceived in the public interest . . . .”).
64 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 34 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST.
2000).
65 Id. cmt. a (“This Section . . . does not forbid lawyers to serve for low fees or without
charge; such service is often in the public interest.”).
66 See id. cmt. b.
67 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 6.1, cmts. 2–3 (AM. LAW INST. 2019) (“[Rule
6.1] recognize[s] the critical need for legal services that exists among persons of limited
means by providing that a substantial majority of the legal services rendered annually to the
disadvantaged be furnished without fee or expectation of fee . . . . Persons eligible for legal
services under [this Rule] are those who qualify for participation in programs funded by the
Legal Services Corporation and those whose incomes and financial resources are slightly
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not only because generally their needs entail maximization of wealth, but also
because in the absence of access to in-house lawyers their needs might be
served by outside counsel.68
Interpreting reasonableness in the “warranted” sense necessitates delving
into the enigma of the stickiness and upward trajectory of legal fees. As the
number of lawyers has grown exponentially since the 1960s, outpacing the (also growing) demand for legal services, commentators have wondered why fees
for legal services have generally not fallen, resulting in a significant unmet demand for legal services by clients who cannot afford to pay the price, even at
times of lawyers’ un- and under-employment.69 As Heinz and others have explained, the market for legal services consists of at least two hemispheres, a
corporate and an individual one.70 In the corporate “greasing the wheels of the
economy” hemisphere, clients can generally afford to pay relatively high fees
and demand for legal services is robust. In the individual “justice” sphere, clients often cannot afford to pay for legal services, resulting in unmet demand.
Prices for legal services in the individual hemisphere do not drop, however, because it has undersupply of attorneys as lawyers flock to the corporate hemisphere.71 Indeed, lawyers continue to seek employment in the corporate hemisphere even when jobs in it are scarce rather than switch to the individual
hemisphere in part because the costs of legal education and of law practice
have escalated leaving them with debts that cannot be serviced easily in the individual sphere, and in part because the individual hemisphere has relatively
low professional esteem.72
The stickiness of legal fees in the individual hemisphere and rising fees in
the corporate hemisphere reveal the irony and counterintuitive legacy of Goldfarb.73 When the U.S. Supreme Court struck down minimum fee schedules, it
did so in the name of increasing competitiveness in the market for legal services, expecting that striking down artificially high “minimum fees” would reabove the guidelines utilized by such programs but nevertheless, cannot afford counsel. Legal services can be rendered to individuals or to organizations such as homeless shelters, battered women’s centers and food pantries that serve those of limited means.”) (emphasis added).
68 Admittedly, entity clients sometimes have indirect compelling needs, for example, the
livelihood interests of their employees. See Kent Greenfield, The Third Way, 37 SEATTLE U.
L. REV. 749, 768 (2014) (advocating for the broadening of corporations’ responsibilities to
include the interests of employees and other stakeholders).
69 For a decade following the Great Recession over-supply of lawyers, some of whom were
un- or under-employed, and the emergence of court-sponsored programs targeting some of
these junior lawyers for apprenticeships led several commentators to speculate that supply of
legal services to the underprivileged may increase. Unfortunately, these predictions have
proven to be false. See Eli Wald, Serfdom Without Overlords: Lawyers and the Fight Against
Class Inequality, 54 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 269, 296 (2016).
70 HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 58, at 319; HEINZ ET AL., supra note 58, at 29.
71 See Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 961–62 (2000).
72 On the escalating cost of legal education and rising student debt, see, Eli Wald, The Contextual Problem of Law Schools, 32 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 281, 284 (2018).
73
See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 780, 793 (1975).
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sult in market-driven lower fees for clients and increased access to legal services.74 The reality has proven this thinking wrong. Market fees have stayed
relatively high and often out of reach for many individual clients. From this
perspective, the reasonableness requirement of Rule 1.5(a) can be understood to
impose a “maximum fee” meant to combat sticky “unwarranted” fees and increase access to legal services, such that “[t]hose seeking to vindicate their
rights through the private bar should not be deterred by the risk of unwarranted
fee burdens.”75
This “unwarranted” interpretation of the access to legal services rationale,
understood in terms of capping fees at a reasonable level to overcome the stickiness of fees in the market for legal services to ensure that average clients are
not priced out, applies to in-house lawyers with only limited force. To the extent that in-house pay is somewhat sticky, for example, because it is tied to the
compensation of elite general counsel whose compensation in turn tracks those
of C-Suite executives,76 unreasonably high salaries and compensation packages
may result in pricing out mid-size and small businesses from the market for inhouse lawyers. Just like high legal fees in the corporate hemisphere lead to
sticky legal fees in the individual hemisphere, high in-house compensation in
the large entity client super-sphere may lead to high sticky in-house compensation throughout the in-house practice universe, resulting in “unwarranted”
compensation undercutting the ability of some entity clients to assert their legal
rights. Yet, entity clients that cannot afford in-house counsel may still retain
outside counsel, and in-house pay may not prove sticky because even at levels
lower than that of elite general counsel, it is still likely to attract lawyers given
the high status of in-house positions.
In sum, the increased access to legal services rationale does not apply well
in the in-house context: entity clients in the corporate hemisphere generally
have ample access to lawyers and legal services and are not of “limited means.”
Moreover, compensation in the in-house universe is not likely to be sticky even
if elite general counsel pay remains relatively high.
c.

Professionalism

Third, the reasonableness requirement of Rule 1.5(a) and Section 34 may
be understood in terms of the social bargain the profession has struck with the
public, pursuant to which, the public grants the profession a noncompetitive
monopoly over the provision of legal service and in return the profession selfregulates, guaranteeing the quality of legal services.77 Exactly because the pro74

Nora Freeman Engstrom, Attorney Advertising and the Contingency Fee Cost Paradox,
65 STAN. L. REV. 633, 643–44 (2013).
75 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 34, cmt. b. (AM. LAW INST.
2000).
76 General Counsel Bonus Structure, ASS’N CORP. COUNS. (Mar. 22, 2013), https://www.acc
.com/resource-library/general-counsel-bonus-structure [https://perma.cc/P+Y5S-X5KK].
77 See Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM.
ECON. REV. 941, 949, 951 (1963) (explaining that since it is quite difficult for lay customers,
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fession has a monopoly, which results in noncompetitive fees, Rule 1.5(a) imposes on lawyers a reasonableness requirement to ensure that fees are not too
high and out of touch with competitive market rates.
That Rule 1.5(a)’s reasonableness requirement is justified in terms of more
than client protection and access to legal services is evident from the applicable
case law. In the leading case of In the Matter of Fordham, attorney Fordham
was disciplined for charging an unreasonable fee.78 Inter alia, Mr. Fordham argued that the fee in question could not be unreasonable because the clients, the
Clarks, gave their informed consent to it.79 The court rejected the clients’ informed consent as a safe harbor argument, holding that the Rule “creates explicitly an objective standard by which attorneys’ fees are to be judged,”80 and
adding that “[t]he test as stated in the [Rule] is whether the fee ‘charged’ is
clearly excessive, not whether the fee is accepted as valid or acquiesced in by
the client.”81 If the sole rationale for the reasonableness requirement was the
protection of vulnerable ill-informed clients from overreaching lawyers, then
the informed consent of sophisticated clients would have been accepted by the
court as a safe harbor because informed consent would have put to rest concerns about client abuse. The court’s rejection of informed consent as a safe
harbor and its insistence that Rule 1.5(a) imposes an objective standard irrespective of the client’s acquiescence means that the Rule’s rationale is broader
than client protection and has in part to do with the status of lawyers as professionals as opposed to mere service providers. Indeed, the notion that the profession might restrict compensation in the name of professionalism is not new. For
example, some commentators have argued that the professional status of lawyers ought to prevent them from accepting stock options.82
The social bargain and monopoly rationale applies to in-house counsel with
as much force as it applies to all other lawyers. All lawyers, in-house attorneys
even ex post, to evaluate the quality of professional services they receive because such services are the product of esoteric knowledge they usually do not possess, the public and the
profession strike a social bargain pursuant to which the public grants the profession a monopoly over the provision of services, and the profession, in return, promulgates and enforces rules of conduct that are meant to ensure the quality of professional services). See also
ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS 59, 62 (1988); MAGALI S. LARSON, THE RISE
OF PROFESSIONALISM 208–09, 211 (1977); TALCOTT PARSONS, The Professions and Social
Structure, in ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 34, 35, 38 (rev. ed. 1954).
78 In re Fordham, 668 N.E.2d 816, 818 (Mass. 1996).
79 See id. at 820.
80 Id. at 824.
81 Id.
82 Z. Jill Barclift, Corporate Responsibility: Ensuring Independent Judgment of the General
Counsel – A Look at Stock Options, 81 N.D. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2005). But see ABA Comm. on
Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 00-418 (2000) (approving lawyers’ acquisition of
ownership in clients subject to compliance with the conflict of interest rules); John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, The Decline in Lawyer Independence: Lawyer Equity Investments in Clients, 81 TEX. L. REV. 405, 516–19 (2002) (exploring conflict concerns related to
stock grants to in-house lawyers); Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interest for In-House Counsel: Issues Emerging from the Expanding Role of the Attorney-Employee, 39 S. TEX. L. REV.
497, 539 (1998) (same).
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included, benefit from a monopoly over the provision of legal services, which
restricts competition from nonlawyer legal service providers and results in noncompetitive fees and compensation.83 The social bargain confers on members
of the legal profession this noncompetitive advantage because it views lawyers
not as mere service providers but as professionals who owe clients corresponding professional duties such as guaranteeing quality84 and keeping fees and
compensation reasonable.
In the context of in-house practice, one might be tempted to overlook the
social bargain rationale on the ground that it contradicts the wishes of both entity clients and their in-house counsel: should not sophisticated entity clients be
able to give their informed consent to noncompetitive in-house pay if they so
desire? Yet such kneejerk reaction will be ill advised. Entity clients, as we have
seen, are hardly a monolith. Some are not powerful or sophisticated vis-à-vis
their in-house counsel. Moreover, the professionalism rationale is not dependent on the wishes of some clients, the Clarks’ or entity clients’. Rather, the reasonableness requirement is an obligation of all lawyers stemming from their
professional status, monopoly over the provision of legal services, and the resulting noncompetitive fees. The informed consent of particular clients in specific cases simply does not suffice to overcome the professional obligation of
reasonable fees because the benefits lawyers derive from their professional status are not conferred by these particular clients but rather by the public as part
of the social bargain.
Similarly, particular lawyers, in-house counsel included, cannot opt out of
their professionalism obligations, the reasonableness of fees included, because
the obligations are part of the social bargain entered into by the profession and
the public. Furthermore, even if they could opt out of certain professional obligations, in-house lawyers ought to exercise caution before doing so. Importantly, rejection of the social bargain and monopoly rationale for imposing a reasonableness requirement on fees and in-house compensation, and, more
generally, of professionalism-imposed duties on lawyers qua lawyers entails
more than Rule 1.5(a). If in-house lawyers were to reject the duties imposed on
them by virtue of their status as professionals, conceptually they risk opening
the door to forfeiting corresponding professional prerogatives, such as being
able to offer their clients confidentiality and restricting the provision of legal
services by nonlawyers.85 This concern, to be sure, is anything but a theoretical
possibility. In Europe, in-house lawyers have fewer professional prerogatives
including significantly reduced confidentiality, exactly because they are not

83

Cf. Arrow, supra note 77, at 949, 951.
Id.; Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1,
1 (1975).
85 See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4 (1998)
(arguing that confidentiality confers upon lawyers a noncompetitive advantage that is not in
the best interest of clients and the public).
84
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considered to be independent professionals and are seen more as embedded
employees of entity clients.86
Put differently, in-house lawyers and the legal profession more generally
cannot pick and choose among the nexus of professional obligations and benefits their status as professionals imposes and confers on them. Rejection of professional duties amounts to triggering the process of de-professionalizing and
de-reregulating the practice of law, which the organized bar has long resisted.87
In this context, the In the Matter of Fordham court’s rejection of informed client consent as a safe harbor for unreasonable fees becomes, no pun intended,
more reasonable from the profession’s point of view.
d.

Fiduciary Duties

The attorney-client relationship is a fiduciary relationship, in which attorney-agents owe clients-principals a fiduciary duty of loyalty.88 Thus, lawyers
are not mere agents but rather special fiduciaries who owe clients heightened
fiduciary duties.89 Arguably, the duty of loyalty encompasses the reasonableness requirement such that charging clients unreasonable fees constitutes an act
of disloyalty in violation of lawyers’ fiduciary obligations.
The fiduciary rationale applies to in-house lawyers who owe entity-clients
a fiduciary duty of loyalty.90 The Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment states in relevant part that “[a] person who obtains a benefit (a) in
breach of a fiduciary duty . . . is liable in restitution to the person to whom the

86

Case C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chems. Ltd. v. European Comm’n, 2010 E.C.R. I-8360, I8393 (lawyers employed as in-house counsel are not sufficiently independent of their corporate entity employers and thus cannot not engage in privileged communications with their
client, the corporation); J. Triplett Mackintosh & Kristen M. Angus, Conflict in Confidentiality: How E.U. Laws Leave In-House Counsel Outside the Privilege, 38 INT’L LAW. 35, 36
(2004).
87 See DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 1–4 (2003).
88 The Restatement defines the attorney-client relation in terms of an agency relationship,
with its corresponding host of default fiduciary duties. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14 (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (the “relationship of client and lawyer arises when: (1) a person manifests to a lawyer the person’s intent that the lawyer provide legal services for the person; and either (a) the lawyer manifests to the person consent to
do so; or (b) the lawyer fails to manifest lack of consent to do so, and the lawyer knows or
reasonably should know that the person reasonably relies on the lawyer to provide the services . . . .”).
89 Deborah A. DeMott, The Lawyer as Agent, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 301, 301–02 (1998); Eli
Wald, Loyalty in Limbo: The Peculiar Case of Attorneys’ Loyalty to Clients, 40 ST. MARY’S
L.J. 909, 924–25 (2009); W. Bradley Wendel. Should Lawyers Be Loyal to Clients, the Law,
or Both?, 5–6 (forthcoming 2019) (on file with author); W. Bradley Wendel, The Problem of
the Faithless Principal: Fiduciary Theory and the Capacities of Clients, 124 PA. ST. L. REV.
107, 144–45 (2019).
90 This conclusion raises intriguing questions about the fiduciary duties of nonlawyer corporate agents to the entity and whether and how lawyers’ duty of loyalty differs than the duty
of nonlawyers. See infra CONCLUSION.
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duty is owed.”91 Comment e. explains that “[a] person occupying a fiduciary or
confidential relation to another,” here an in-house lawyer, “is ordinarily required to observe ‘the utmost good faith’ in dealings within the scope of the relation.”92 In particular, “[o]ver and above the duty of loyalty described in the
preceding Comment, this obligation of heightened good faith bars the fiduciary
from taking undue advantage of the beneficiary in direct dealings between them
. . . ”,93 such as accepting an unreasonable salary and overall compensation. A
2005 draft of the Restatement included the following illustration, explicitly applying a reasonableness requirement to in-house pay:
Corporation’s President hires General Counsel to handle a pending regulatory
investigation at an annual salary of $1 million. General Counsel works diligently
for a period of 12 months, achieving a favorable result. In recognition of General
Counsel’s services to Corporation, President awards him a bonus consisting of
cash and other allowances having an aggregate value of $20 million. On suit
brought by shareholders in the name of Corporation, the court finds that a bonus
of $20 million (paid in addition to his regular salary) is “clearly excessive” for
General Counsel’s services to Corporation and that General Counsel’s acceptance of the bonus constitutes a breach of General Counsel’s fiduciary duty
to Corporation. Corporation has a claim by the rule of this Section to recover the
amount by which $21 million exceeds a reasonable compensation for General
Counsel’s services for the 12-month period.94

As was the case with the social bargain and monopoly rationale, some inhouse counsel (and other lawyers) may resist fiduciary-based reasonableness
restrictions on fees and compensation on the ground that they increasingly view
themselves and are understood by their clients to be little more than service
providers, as opposed to fiduciaries. Yet, the dismissal of fiduciary duties and
the treatment of clients as arm’s length customers, as opposed to fiduciaries,
entails the same risk of snubbing professional duties—the erosion of corresponding prerogatives that have long been a staple of and defined the practice
of law.
In sum, the intent behind Rule 1.5(a) interpreted in the context of the Rules
as a whole strongly suggests that the reasonableness requirement ought to apply
to in-house compensation. Although the client protection rationale does not apply to all entity-clients equally because some large entity-clients tend to be savvy and not in need of protection from in-house lawyers, other entity clients are
very much in need of protection. As importantly, the overall bent of the Rules
in favor of client protection and a one-size-fits-all regulatory approach mitigates toward imposing the reasonableness requirement on in-house lawyers.
Next, while the increased access to legal services rationale generally poorly fits
in-house practice realities, the professionalism rationale explained in terms of
91

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43 (AM. LAW INST.,
2011).
92 Id. at cmt. e.
93 Id. (emphasis added).
94 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43, cmt. e., Illustration 26 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005).
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the social bargain, monopoly over the provision of legal services and the corresponding monopolistic benefits of confidentiality and noncompetitive fees
strongly applies to in-house lawyers. Finally, the fiduciary rationale imposes on
in-house lawyers a duty of utmost good faith which prevents them from accepting unreasonable pay. Consequently, in-house lawyers’ salaries and overall
compensation are subject to a reasonableness requirement.
3. Consistency Across the Rules: Rule 1.5(a) and Rule 1.8(a)
The conclusion that the reasonableness requirement of Rule 1.5(a) applies
to in-house compensation is supported by analysis of Rule 1.8(a). Rule 1.8(a)
states in relevant part that:
A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly
acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to
a client unless: (1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the
interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing in a manner that can be reasonably understood by the client
. . . .95

Conceptually, an employment agreement is a business transaction between
an in-house attorney and an entity client and certain components of overall
compensation, such as stock grants and stock options, constitute the acquisition
of an ownership and security interest in the client, triggering the fairness and
reasonableness requirements of Rule 1.8(a).
The Comment makes it clear that in-house pay is subject to a reasonableness requirement, imposed either by Rule 1.5(a) or by Rule 1.8(a). It states in
relevant part that: “It [the Rule] does not apply to ordinary fee arrangements
between client and lawyer, which are governed by Rule 1.5, although its requirements must be met when the lawyer accepts an interest in the client’s
business or other nonmonetary property as payment of all or part of a fee.”96
Thus, if salary and overall in-house compensation are “ordinary fee arrangements between client and lawyer,” as the above analysis argues,97 then Rule
1.5(a) and its reasonableness requirement apply. If salary and overall compensation are not “ordinary fee arrangements,” then they are part of a business
transaction subject to the reasonableness requirement of Rule 1.8(a). Indeed,
the Comment clearly applies to stock grants and options, stating that “its requirements must be met when the lawyer accepts an interest in the client’s
business or other nonmonetary property as payment of all or part of a fee.”98
Thus, the Comment identifies a clear conceptual fork in the road to a consistent
and coherent construction of Rules 1.5(a) and 1.8(a): either in-house pay, including salaries, is a “fee” subject to the reasonableness requirement of Rule

95
96
97
98

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) (emphasis added).
Id. r. 1.8 cmt. 1.
Supra Section I.A.1-2.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(a) cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).
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1.5(a); or it is not, in which case it constitutes a business transaction and subject
to the heightened reasonableness requirement of Rule 1.8(a).
Unfortunately, the Chism courts unnecessarily confused this straightforward point. The trial court, having ruled that in-house bonuses were not a “fee”
for purposes of Rule 1.5(a), inconsistently held that bonuses were a “fee” arrangement for purposes of the comment to Rule 1.8(a).99 Perhaps mindful of
the internal contradiction in its own analysis, the trial court then concluded that
while salaries and bonuses were a “fee” for purposes of Rule 1.8(a), they were
not an “ordinary fee arrangement” (because on the facts of the case they were a
modification of an existing fee arrangement) and therefore held that 1.8(a) applied.100 With due respect, this analysis makes little sense. If in-house compensation, including salaries and bonuses, is not a “fee,” then the distinction between “ordinary fee” and “nonordinary fee” is irrelevant. Instead, salaries and
bonuses will be subject to the reasonableness requirement of Rule 1.8(a) not
because they are nonordinary fees, but because they are not a fee and thus a
business transaction subject to Rule 1.8(a). If, on the other hand, salaries and
bonuses are a fee, then they are subject to Rule 1.5(a), not 1.8(a).
Note that as the Comment to Rule 1.8 makes clear, in-house pay is clearly
subject to a reasonableness requirement, either 1.5(a)’s “standard” reasonableness requirement, which applies to all “fees,” or 1.8(a)’s “heightened” reasonableness requirement (adding fairness, full disclosure and transmittal in writing
to reasonableness), which applies to business transactions with clients.101
Which reasonableness requirement better fits in-house practice? The court of
appeals disapproved of applying the heightened reasonableness requirement of
Rule 1.8(a) to in-house lawyers’ salaries and bonuses. It pointed out, correctly,
that subjecting in-house pay to the heightened reasonableness requirement of
Rule 1.8(a) would burden the lawyer-employee—client-employer relationship
and “disturb the settled expectations of many lawyer-employees” by subjecting
employment benefits to the scrutiny of Rule 1.8(a).102 The court of appeals
added that such an interpretation would subject “standard wage contracts for
lawyer-employees . . . to greater scrutiny overall than standard fee contracts,
which are generally exempt from the rule [1.8(a)],”103 and only subject to the
lesser-imposing reasonableness requirement of Rule 1.5(a). Notably, the court
of appeals could have achieved its policy outcome—exempting in-house pay
from the heightened reasonableness requirement of Rule 1.8(a)—by simply
holding that in-house pay is a “fee” per Rule 1.5(a), in which case per the
Comment to Rule 1.8(a) the latter Rule would be inapplicable. Indeed, logically
99

Chism v. Tri-State Constr., Inc., 374 P.3d 193, 210 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).
Id.
101 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2019) (“[Rule 1.8(a)]
does not apply to ordinary fee arrangements between client and lawyer, which are governed
by Rule 1.5, although its requirements must be met when the lawyer accepts an interest in
the client’s business or other nonmonetary property as payment of all or part of a fee.”).
102 Chism, 374 P.3d at 210.
103
Id.
100
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that was the only consistent interpretation open to the court of appeals: finding
that salaries and bonuses were an “ordinary fee arrangement” per the Comment
to Rule 1.8(a) meant that they were a “fee” and thus subject to Rule 1.5(a), a
point lost on the court of appeals.
Moreover, applying Rule 1.8(a) to in-house pay, as the trial court found,
would create a confusing schism. Rule 1.8(a) only applies to a “lawyer” and a
“client,” that is, it only applies if an attorney-client relationship exists. Thus, if
in-house pay was deemed a business transaction triggering Rule 1.8(a), the
Rule would apply to situations when an outside counsel is negotiating with her
client to become its in-house counsel (because an attorney-client relationship
already exists between the parties), but would not apply when a client would be
negotiating an in-house position with a lawyer who does not represent it.104 In
sum, as the Comment to Rule 1.8 states, “ordinary fee arrangements between
client and lawyer,”105 that is, ordinary compensation matters in the attorneyclient relationship, inclusive of in-house compensation, ought to be governed
by Rule 1.5(a), not Rule 1.8(a).
4. Applying a Reasonableness Requirement to In-House Pay
A plain language, as well as an intent-based interpretation of Rule 1.5(a),
suggests that “fee” ought to be construed to include in-house pay. Such an important and timely issue, however, should not wait until it makes its way to
state supreme courts or risk conflicting interpretations by different courts. Instead, the ABA should address the issue by revising the first sentence of Rule
1.5(a) and comment 1 respectively to read:
1.5(a) “A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or compensation or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The
reasonableness requirement applies to the compensation of in-house lawyers.”106
[1] “Paragraph (a) requires that lawyers charge fees and forms of compensation that are reasonable under the circumstances.”
In the alternative, the ABA can leave Rule 1.5(a) and comment 1 intact and
add to its terminology section, Rule 1.0, a new definition as follows:
1.0(x) “Fee” denotes the payment for legal services provided by a lawyer
to a client, including payment by an organizational client to its in-house counsel in the form of salaries, bonuses, or nonmonetary benefits.
Notably, even if the ABA were to amend the Rules to clarify that “fee” includes in-house salaries and bonuses, three doctrinal issues warrant attention.

104
105
106

Id. at 211 n.28.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).
Appendix A collects all the proposed amendments to the Rules discussed in this Article.
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Stock Grants and Stock Options

Consider stock grants and stock options, a common component of in-house
counsel’s compensation.107 Recall that Comment 1 to Rule 1.8 states in relevant
part that “[the Rule] does not apply to ordinary fee arrangements between client
and lawyer, which are governed by Rule 1.5, although its requirements must be
met when the lawyer accepts an interest in the client’s business or other nonmonetary property as payment of all or part of a fee.”108 Accordingly, while
most aspects of in-house compensation, namely salaries, bonuses and nonmonetary benefits would be governed by Rule 1.5(a), stock grants and stock options
would be governed by the stricter Rule 1.8(a). Notably, this is exactly the current state of affairs for all lawyers, whose fees are generally subject to Rule
1.5(a), except that stock grants and stock options are subject to Rule 1.8(a), explained by a concern regarding a conflict of interest inherent in fees that grant
lawyers an interest in the client’s business.109
In addition to Rule 1.8(a), stock grants and stock options are also regulated,
indirectly, by Rule 5.6(a). Rule 5.6(a) states in relevant part that: “A lawyer
shall not participate in offering or making: . . . a partnership, shareholders, operating, employment, or other similar type of agreement that restricts the right
of a lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship.”110 The Rule has
routinely been interpreted to forbid in-house lawyers from becoming parties to
noncompete agreements.111 In the context of in-house practice, however, Rule
5.6 imposes a harsh constraint because stock grants and stock options are a
common feature of in-house compensation packages and the grant of stocks
and stock options is often subject to the execution of a noncompete agreement.112
Currently, some in-house lawyers and their entity clients may awkwardly
ignore the constraints of Rule 5.6(a), yet even if some in-house lawyers are
willing to engage in misconduct by ignoring the rule and risk disciplinary action, violating Rule 5.6(a) creates uncertainty as to the enforceability of noncompete clauses for in-house counsel. A stock grant or option agreement between an in-house attorney and an entity-client is prima facie valid,
107

Barclift, supra note 82, at 16; Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 82, at 517; Liggio, supra note 38, at 1026 n.16; Moore, supra note 82, at 538.
108 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) (emphasis added).
109 Id.
110 Id. r. 5.6(a).
111 See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-381 (1994);
N.J. Sup. Ct. Advisory Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 708 (2006); Tonio D. DeSorrento, Enforceability of Restrictive Covenants: Are In-House Counsel to be Exempt from NonCompetes?, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 487, 492–93 (2007).
112 M. Scott McDonald, Noncompete Contracts: Understanding the Cost of Unpredictability, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 137, 151 (2003) (“It is increasingly common to see noncompete provisions tied to stock options or stock grants.”); Yifat Aran, Note, Beyond Covenants
Not to Compete: Equilibrium in High-Tech Startup Labor Markets, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1235,
1273–76 (2018).
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notwithstanding an offending noncompete clause in violation of Rule 5.6(a).113
If a dispute arises between in-house counsel and the client over a violation of
the noncompete, for example, when the client seeks to enforce the noncompete
and enjoin its former in-house lawyer from taking an in-house position with a
business competitor, the former in-house counsel will ask a court to set aside
the offending noncompete clause as violative of Rule 5.6(a) and thus of public
policy. In other words, a noncompete clause in a stock grant agreement that violates Rule 5.6(a) does not automatically void the entire agreement. Rather, a
court will have to entertain a motion to strike the clause as against public policy. This posture entails inherent uncertainty, as a court considering such a motion, may refuse to set the clause aside and enforce the noncompete, for example, if the in-house counsel who executed it was aware of Rule 5.6(a), or if she
exercised stock options or cashed out stock grants pursuant to the agreement. In
the alternative, the court may strike the noncompete clause, either letting the
rest of the agreement stand, or invalidating the entire agreement.
In addition to the inherent uncertainty regarding enforceability of noncompete clauses entered into by in-house counsel, which the lawyers can avoid by
simply complying with the noncompete, this state of affairs forces in-house
counsel to make an uncomfortable choice: forgo a common form of compensation or violate Rule 5.6(a) even when no disputes arise with the entity-client.
Worse, the knowing violation of Rule 5.6(a) may trigger other violations of the
Rules, such as failure to report one’s own misconduct on the part of the inhouse attorney pursuant to Rule 8.3(a),114 and failure to put in place reasonable
113

Misconduct is a matter of discipline, not civil liability, and, in particular, a violation of
the Rules does not in-and-of-itself invalidate any civil agreement or lead to civil liability.
The Scope section of the Rules explains that: “The Rules are designed to provide guidance to
lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They
are not designed to be a basis for civil liability. Furthermore, the purpose of the Rules can
be subverted when they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural weapons. The fact
that a Rule is a just basis for a lawyer's self-assessment, or for sanctioning a lawyer under the
administration of a disciplinary authority, does not imply that an antagonist in a collateral
proceeding or transaction has standing to seek enforcement of the Rule.” MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT, SCOPE, cmt. 20 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) (emphasis added). The comment
adds that: “Nevertheless, since the Rules do establish standards of conduct by lawyers, a
lawyer's violation of a Rule may be evidence of breach of the applicable standard of conduct.” Id. Thus, although a violation of the Rules does not automatically invalidate a contract, misconduct may serve as a ground for setting a contract or a clause aside as violative of
public policy.
114 Rule 8.3(a) states that: “A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer’s
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate
professional authority.” Id. r. 8.3(a). While the rule itself mandates reporting of “another
lawyer[’s]” misconduct, it has often been interpreted to also require self-reporting. See, e.g.,
Ohio Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline, Op. 2007-1 (2007) (“A lawyer is required to self-report his or her professional misconduct, as well as report others’ misconduct
. . . .”); Vincent R. Johnson, Legal Malpractice Litigation and the Duty to Report Misconduct, 1 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 40, 44 n.5 (2011). To the extent that
Rule 8.3(a) requires self-reporting, surly a knowing violation of the rule for personal gain—
securing stock grants—would entail “fitness as a lawyer.”
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procedures to ensure compliance with the Rules on the part of the general
counsel as head of the in-house legal department pursuant to Rule 5.1(a).115
The comment to Rule 5.6(a) explains that it is grounded in respect for the
client’s freedom to choose a lawyer.116 Consider the following typical example.
Lawyer, a partner at Law Firm A, represents Client. Lawyer wishes to move to
Law Firm B. If Lawyer were subject to a noncompete agreement with Law
Firm A prohibiting Lawyer from representing current clients of Law Firm A
upon leaving the firm, Client will not be able to move with Lawyer to Law
Firm B and will be deprived her choice of lawyer, namely, Lawyer.
Note, however, that this typical concern does not apply to in-house counsel. When an in-house counsel leaves her position with an entity client, because
the entity was the in-house counsel’s only client, no current client exists that
may wish to move with the in-house counsel to another entity and will be deprived her choice of counsel. Indeed, the only party that may be denied its
choice of counsel is not a current client of the in-house counsel but the potential
new entity employer, typically not a client who lacks access to lawyers and legal services.
That the main rationale for Rule 5.6(a)—protecting current clients’ choice
of counsel—does not apply to in-house lawyers is hardly a surprise: the Rule
was promulgated before the rise of in-house counsel and before stock grants
and stock options became a common feature of executive compensation, inhouse lawyers included. Moreover, although several ethics opinions have construed Rule 5.6(a) to apply to in-house lawyers,117 arguably that interpretation
was erroneous, ignoring the in-house context in favor of applying the rule to all
lawyers consistent with the one-size-fits-all regulatory approach of the ABA.
Moreover, as the typical example of lawyer mobility illustrates, Rule 5.6(a)
was designed to prohibit noncompete agreements between lawyers and their
law firms, which may restrict clients’ choice of counsel.118 However, in the inhouse context the noncompete agreement is not between lawyers and their law
firms but rather between entity-clients and their in-house lawyers. To the extent
that such agreements between clients and lawyers restrict the right of lawyers to
practice they are conceptually similar to limitations imposed by the conflict
rules on lawyers’ practice and should not be the subject of Rule 5.6(a).119 Ra115

Rule 5.1(a) states that: “A partner in a law firm, and a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm, shall make
reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance
that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct.” MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.1(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). For purposes of Rule 5.1(a), an in-house
legal department is a law firm. See id. r. 1.0(c).
116 Id. r. 5.6 cmt. 1 (“An agreement restricting the right of lawyers to practice after leaving a
firm not only limits their professional autonomy but also limits the freedom of clients to
choose a lawyer.”).
117 DeSorrento, supra note 111 at 492–93 (internal citations omitted).
118 Supra note 116 and accompanying text.
119 Rules 1.7 and 1.9, for example, conceptually restrict a lawyer’s right to practice due to
duties owed respectively to current and former clients, and such “restrictions” are in part a
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ther than applying Rule 5.6(a) mechanically and harshly to in-house lawyers in
circumstances that fail to adhere to the Rule’s rationale, Rule 5.6(a) should be
amended as follows to clarify that it does not apply to agreements between clients and their in-house counsel:
A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making:
(a) a partnership, shareholders, operating, employment, or other similar
type of agreement that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship, except an agreement concerning benefits upon retirement or an agreement concerning the grant of stock grants or stock options to
in-house counsel as part of a compensation agreement subject to a reasonable
noncompete provision;
b.

Fee Modifications

The established interpretation of Rule 1.5(a) holds that its reasonableness
requirement applies to both the initial fee arrangement between attorney and
client and to any fee agreement modifications after the attorney-client relationship is formed.120 Moreover, changes in fee arrangements that involve a lawyer
acquiring an interest in the client’s business require compliance with Rule
1.8(a).121 Accordingly, if in-house salaries, bonuses and nonmonetary compensation such as health benefits were to be deemed fees, then any modification to
these terms would be subject to Rule 1.5(a), and any modifications to in-house
lawyers’ stock grants and options would be subject to Rule 1.8(a). To be sure,
“fee modification” may be agreed upon in the original “fee” arrangement. For
example, a lawyer may advise a client in an initial fee arrangement that the
lawyer may reasonably increase her fees annually without subjecting herself to
Rule 1.8(a).122 Thus, a client-employer may reference adjustments or anticipate
raises to a lawyer-employee’s salaries, bonuses, and nonmonetary compensation in the initial employer-employee agreement.

function of agreements between clients and attorneys, manifested in clients’ informed consent. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b)(4), 1.9(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).
120 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-458 (2011).
121 Id.; Chism v. Tri-State Constr., Inc., 374 P.3d 193, 209 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016) (internal
citations omitted).
122 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, supra note 120; MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) (“When the lawyer has regularly represented a client, they ordinarily will have evolved an understanding concerning the basis or
rate of the fee . . . for which the client will be responsible. In a new client-lawyer relationship, however, an understanding as to fees . . . must be promptly established.”); see also
Douglas R. Richmond, Changing Fee Arrangements During Representations: What are the
Rules?, 15 PROF. LAW. 2, 2, 17 (2004).
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A Personal Conflict of Interest Negotiating One’s Own Fees, Rule
1.7(a)(2)

In Chism, Tri-State argued (and the trial court agreed) that bonus negotiations between Mr. Chism and the entity-client violated Rule 1.7.123 Rule
1.7(a)(2) prohibits lawyers from “represent[ing] a client if the representation
involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if . . . there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients
will be materially limited . . . by a personal interest of the lawyer.”124 Specifically, Tri-State argued that an in-house lawyer’s negotiations with a client regarding a bonus involve the lawyer’s personal interest in the bonus and thus
constitute a conflict.125
Outside of the in-house context, the Rules elegantly sidestep the argument
that Rule 1.7(a)(2) applies to fee negotiations between attorney and client. At
the outset of the attorney-client relationship when the fee arrangement is negotiated for the first time, the lawyer does not represent the client and thus Rule
1.7 does not apply. Notably, however, Rule 1.5(a) applies at this stage guaranteeing that the fee is reasonable, as well as to fee modifications.126
In one instance, however, Rule 1.7(a)(2) arguably applies to fee negotiations, when a lawyer negotiates with a current client a fee for a new matter, because one could assert that the lawyer’s representation of the client in the pending matter could be materially limited by the lawyer’s personal interest in
negotiating the fee in the new matter. Such an argument ought to be rejected for
at least two reasons. First, in an ongoing attorney-client relationship, the attorney does not represent the client in the fee negotiations. Second, burdening the
fee negotiations with an informed consent requirement, the practical impact of
applying Rule 1.7(a)(2) to the situation would be impractical and unnecessary
given that Rule 1.5(a), which applies to the new matter, already guarantees that
the fee in the new matter will be reasonable.
The same rationale should apply to negotiations between in-house lawyers
and their clients. At the outset of the relationship the in-house lawyer does not
represent the client and thus Rule 1.7(a)(2) does not apply to the compensation
negotiations, but Rule 1.5(a) does. Subsequently, fee modifications, including
bonus negotiations, will be subject to Rule 1.5(a) and not Rule 1.7(a)(2) because the in-house lawyer does not represent the entity-client in the fee modification negotiations and because Rule 1.5(a) guarantees the reasonableness of
the modified in-house compensation.
To recap the analysis to this point, the best interpretation of the Rules,
which the ABA may confirm in clarifying amendments,127 is as follows: the
reasonableness requirement of Rule 1.5(a) generally applies to in-house pay
123
124
125
126
127

Chism, 374 P.3d at 207.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).
Chism, 374 P.3d at 208.
Supra Section I.A.4.b.
See infra Appendix A.
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with the exception of stock grants and stock options, which are subject to the
heightened requirements of Rule 1.8(a). Rule 5.6(a) should not preclude the
grant of stock and stock options to in-house lawyers subject to a reasonable
noncompete provision. Modifications to in-house pay, just like modifications to
all fees, are generally subject to Rule 1.5(a), except in circumstances that involve modifications to stock grants and options, which are subject to Rule
1.8(a). Finally, Rule 1.7(a)(2) does not impose an additional constraint on inhouse pay, above and beyond the reasonableness standard of Rule 1.5(a).
B. What’s Reasonable? Assessing the Reasonableness of In-House Pay
Rule 1.5(a) states in relevant part that;
The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include
the following:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular
employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing
the services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.128

The Comment adds that “[t]he factors specified in (1) through (8) are not
exclusive. Nor will each factor be relevant in each instance.”129
To begin with, per the second factor, in-house compensation may take into
account that employment as in-house counsel precludes other employment by
the lawyer, rendering a salary, as opposed to an hourly rate or a flat fee, a reasonable arrangement. Importantly, taking a position as an in-house counsel not
only foregoes the representation of clients other than the entity-employer, but
may also result in reduced opportunities for training and mentoring compared
to traditional law firms, as well as a more limited diet of well-rounded work assignments.130
Applying the other Rule 1.5(a) factors demands careful contextual attention. The world of in-house counsel is incredibly diverse with the practice varying greatly depending on client needs and job responsibilities,131 such that the
application of the first, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh factors will vary depending on the circumstances.

128

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).
Id. r. 1.5 cmt. 1.
130 Eli Wald, Getting in and out of the House: Career Trajectories of In-House Lawyers, 88
FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (on file with author).
131
Id.
129
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Per the first factor, the reasonableness of in-house pay will depend on the
time and labor required. Some clients, such as Tri-State, only need a part-time
in-house attorney working on average 1.5 hours a day,132 whereas others will
expect a more traditional 9 to 5 workday and still others may expect service
around the clock based on the twenty-four-seven hypercompetitive model of
Big Law.133 Next, some in-house lawyers may be subject-matter experts with
corresponding limited time and labor requirements, for example, an associate
general counsel for intellectual property affairs. Others may be the general
counsel charged with overseeing all the legal affairs of the client-entity, and
even within the general counsel universe, time and labor expectations may vary
greatly depending on clients’ needs. Indeed, some general counsel, for example, elite general counsel serving large entity clients, may assume broader responsibilities as legal advisors, counsel, business leaders, compliance officers,
human resource officers etc., significantly increasing their time and labor.134
Moreover, the entire notion of in-house counsel’s “time and labor required” differs from that of outside counsel. Traditionally, outside counsel’s
“time” has been quantified and measured for purposes of fee calculations in
terms of billable hours.135 Yet, not only do in-house lawyers traditionally not
record billable hours, but that concept overlooks an important aspect of inhouse lawyers’ time investment in “soft” hours, getting to know the industry,
the particulars of the entity-client, the various constituents of the client, and the
non-legal bases of knowledge relevant for doing the job right.136 In particular,
travel may be a significant aspect of some in-house lawyers’ work-related
commitments, yet play a minor role in the professional lives of others.137 In order to do the job effectively and become persuasive, let alone influential within
their entity-clients, in-house counsel often invest ample soft hours that ought to
be acknowledged and reflected in their pay.138

132

Chism, 374 P.3d at 196.
Eli Wald, Glass Ceilings and Dead Ends: Professional Ideologies, Gender Stereotypes,
and the Future of Women Lawyers at Large Law Firms, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2245, 2263
(2010) [hereinafter Wald, Glass Ceilings and Dead Ends].
134 PRASHANT DUBEY & EVA KRIPALANI, THE GENERALIST COUNSEL: HOW LEADING
GENERAL COUNSEL ARE SHAPING TOMORROW’S COMPANIES 136 (2013); BEN W. HEINEMAN,
JR., THE INSIDE COUNSEL REVOLUTION: RESOLVING THE PARTNER-GUARDIAN TENSION 32
(2016); E. NORMAN VEASEY & CHRISTINE T. DI GUGLIELMO, INDISPENSABLE COUNSEL: THE
CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER IN THE NEW REALITY 39 (2012).
135 WILLIAM G. ROSS, THE HONEST HOUR: THE ETHICS OF TIME-BASED BILLING BY
ATTORNEYS 21 (1996); Douglas R. Richmond, In Defense of the Billable Hour, 14 PROF.
LAW. 1, 4 (2003); Douglas R. Richmond, The New Law Firm Economy, Billable Hours, and
Professional Responsibility, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 207, 210 (2000).
136 Eli Wald, In-House Myths, WIS. L. REV. 407, 427–32 (2012) [hereinafter Wald, In-House
Myths] (exploring the notion of “soft” in-house hours).
137 Id. at 434–35.
138 Compare ROSS, supra note 135, at 231, and Susan Saab Fortney, The Billable Hours
Derby: Empirical Data on the Problems and Pressure Points, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 171,
179 (2005), with Wald, In-House Myths, supra note 136, at 428–29 (exploring the notion of
“soft” in-house hours).
133
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The first factor also references “the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved,”139 which may vary greatly among in-house lawyers: some deal primarily with routine, relatively simple, matters; whereas others address complex
and difficult challenges.140 Similarly, the last clause of the first factor, “the skill
requisite to perform the legal service properly,”141 may vary greatly among inhouse lawyers. For some subject-matter experts, it would mean narrowly construed legal skills, for others the job would require having the skills of a generalist, and yet for others the necessary skills would entail non-legal expertise and
knowledge.
The fourth factor, “the amount involved and the results obtained,” will also
vary depending on context.142 Smaller entity clients will tend to have routine
matters with relatively modest amounts at stake whereas large entity clients
will have larger amounts in play.143 The amount involved and the results obtained will also depend on the nature of the services performed in-house: some
entities will rely on their in-house legal departments to handle all of their affairs, including their “make or break” litigation and transactional work; whereas other entity clients will prefer to use outside counsel for these type of matters.144 The same contextual approach will guide the assessment of the fifth
factor, “the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.”145
Depending on in-house counsels’ job descriptions and responsibilities, some
will regularly face tight turnaround times and strict deadlines whereas others
will enjoy a more relaxed work environment, affecting the reasonableness of
the compensation.
“[T]he nature . . . of the professional relationship with the client,”146 an aspect of the sixth factor, may include considerations such as whether one is an
in-house lawyer or the general counsel, as well as whether one served previously as an outside counsel to the entity client. The “length of the professional relationship” indicates that seniority and experience with the client are relevant to
assessing the reasonableness of the compensation,147 as are “the experience,
reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services” per the
seventh factor.148
Notably, the eighth and third factors require close scrutiny when applied to
in-house practice. As we have seen above, stock options have emerged as a
common component of some in-house lawyers’ compensation, triggering Rule
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MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(a)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).
See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 35, at 277; Rosen, supra note 36, at 483.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(a)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).
Id. r. 1.5(a)(4).
Liggio, supra note 38, at 1207.
Id.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(a)(5) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).
Id. r. 1.5(a)(6).
Id.
Id. r. 1.5(a)(7).
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1.5(a)’s eighth factor, “whether the fee is fixed or contingent,”149 and once
again, the unique context of in-house practice warrants careful consideration of
the Rule. Traditionally, contingency fees, ranging from 15 to 35 percent, have
been deemed reasonable even when they were found to be higher compared to
an hourly fee exactly because of the risk of nonpayment inherent in a contingency fee arrangement.150
To some extent, the rationale behind the eighth factor carries over to the
world of in-house counsel. Stock grants and stock options as part of an in-house
lawyer’s compensation introduce risk because stock may not appreciate (or
even depreciate) and options at the time they mature may be worth nothing,
such that the contingency and higher risk involved may explain and deem reasonable higher contingent compensation as compared with fixed compensation.151
Indeed, one aspect of stock as a component of compensation suggests even
greater flexibility in assessing the reasonableness of contingent in-house compensation as compared to traditional contingency fees. While some aspects of
traditional contingency fees are outside of a lawyer’s control, such as the facts
of the case, the governing law, and the jurors’ or judge’s sentiments; a typical
lawyer undertaking a matter on a contingency fee has ample control over
whether to take the case, and, if taken, on the outcome of the case by virtue of
the quality of the representation she provides to the client. In contrast, the typical in-house lawyer will have little impact on the contingency involved with the
value of the stock or stock options, which will be determined by market performance and considerations. Because in-house counsel, compared to plaintiffs’
attorneys, have relatively little control over the contingent nature of their compensation, they assume greater risk when accepting stock as a component of
compensation, which may support higher compensation as reasonable.
At the same time, important differences ought to inform the assessment of
contingency pay as a component of reasonableness. In general, the Rules permit contingency fee arrangements in Rule 1.5(c) notwithstanding the conflict of
interest they introduce vis-à-vis the client to increase access to legal services
for those who cannot afford to pay and the corresponding concern that, absent
149

Id. r. 1.5(a)(8).
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 567 (4th ed. 1992) (The economic
rationale for fee enhancement in contingency cases has been explained as follows: “A contingent fee must be higher than a fee for the same legal services paid as they are performed.
The contingent fee compensates the lawyer not only for the legal services he renders but for
the loan of those services. The implicit interest rate on such a loan is high because the risk of
default (the loss of the case, which cancels the debt of the client to the lawyer) is much higher than that of conventional loans”); Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the Prince of Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29, 43 (1989). The risk
rationale has been adopted by courts. See, e.g., Ketchum v. Moses, 17 P.3d 735, 742 (Cal.
2001) (“A lawyer who both bears the risk of not being paid and provides legal services is not
receiving the fair market value of his work if he is paid only for the second of these functions. If he is paid no more, competent counsel will be reluctant to accept fee award cases.”)
(citations omitted).
151
See Barclift, supra note 82, at 7–10.
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contingency arrangements, some meritorious claims will not be brought by underprivileged clients who cannot afford to pay lawyers to do so.152 Notably, no
analogous rationale supports approving contingency compensation for most inhouse lawyers. Whatever the rationale may be, from prevailing practice realities in the corporate executive compensation sphere, to aligning the interests of
in-house lawyers and their clients, to accommodating corporate entities’ preferences for flexibility and efficiencies in structuring compensation, most corporate entities do not offer stock grants or stock options to their in-house lawyers
because they otherwise cannot afford them.153 Because stock grants and options
do not serve the goal of increasing access to legal services for those who cannot
afford to pay for them and instead simply reflect risk allocation between inhouse counsel and their entity clients, the contingency risk shouldered by inhouse counsel is of different and smaller nature than the one shouldered by
plaintiffs’ attorneys and is hence subjected to the requirements of Rule 1.8(a) as
a business transaction.154
Finally, “the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services,”155 the third factor, traditionally takes into account relevant cost of living, the cost of doing business, and other relevant practice considerations, for
example, accounting for the fact that lawyers in large metropolitan centers
charge higher fees than their counterparts in mid-markets or smaller towns; or
that urban lawyers charge higher fees than their rural colleagues within the
same jurisdiction.156 The same insight naturally applies to in-house lawyers
who may practice in in-house legal departments across different localities,
which vary in size, structure, tasks and roles.
The nature of in-house practice, however, may require a more flexible and
expansive interpretation of the third factor to encompass not only what other inhouse lawyers make, but also what outside counsel charge, and, just as importantly, what other corporate executives/employees in the entity make. Inhouse legal departments tend to hire experienced lawyers, often partners and
associates from within the ranks of their outside counsel.157 Thus, a relevant
factor in assessing the reasonableness of in-house compensation needs to be the
fees and compensation of these outside counsel lawyers, which entity clients
152

Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal Practice,
47 DEPAUL L. REV. 267, 307 (1998); Richard W. Painter, Litigating on a Contingency: A
Monopoly of Champions or a Market for Champerty?, 71 CHI. KENT L. REV. 625, 627–28
(1995); see also Richard M. Birnholz, The Validity and Propriety of Contingent Fee Controls, 37 UCLA L. REV. 949, 953 (1990).
153 See Barclift, supra note 82, at 7–10; Liggio, supra note 38, at 1206.
154 Supra Section I.A.4.a.
155 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(a)(3) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).
156 See, e.g., Kalloo v. Unlimited Mech. Co. of NY, Inc., 977 F. Supp. 2d 209, 212
(E.D.N.Y. 2013) (stating that the “court should . . . ‘attempt to approximate the market rates
prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill,
experience, and reputation’ ”) (quoting Green v. City of N.Y., 403 Fed. Appx. 626, 629 (2d
Cir. 2010)).
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Wald, In-House Myths, supra note 136, at 445–46.
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will pay attention to in terms of being able to recruit and retain their in-house
lawyers. At the same time, in order to be able to do their jobs effectively, including being taken seriously, respected, and deferred to by their nonlawyer
colleagues outside their in-house legal departments, in-house lawyers’ compensation will need to be on par with, and reflect, the compensation of nonlawyer
counterparts.
Notably, while taking account of nonlawyers’ compensation in assessing
the reasonableness of in-house lawyers’ pay is necessary and sensible, it is a
significant expansion of the Rule. Generally speaking, executive compensation
in corporate America is not subject to an objective reasonableness standard. Rather, determinations of executive compensation are considered part of the duty
of care in the corporate governance apparatus, which means that they are subject to the Business Judgement Rule.158 Briefly, this means that as long as executive compensation decisions are well-informed and free of conflicts of interest, courts do not substantively second-guess them and do not review them for
reasonableness, instead deferring to the business judgment of the authorized
corporate constituents who made them.159 Some commentators have harshly
criticized the application of the Business Judgment Rule doctrine to executive
compensation, arguing that it results in waste, or unusually high and unreasonable compensation packages that escape judicial scrutiny.160
A classic example of excessive compensation concerns is the litigation surrounding the executive compensation packages at Disney.161 To entice Mr.
Ovitz away from his lucrative Hollywood job and take the reins at Disney, the
Disney Board offered him a lucrative compensation package.162 When Mr.
Ovitz left Disney a mere thirteen months later, his severance package entitled
him to approximately $130 Million and Disney shareholders sued, arguing essentially that the compensation package was unreasonable and constituted a
waste of corporate funds.163 In a highly watched, unanimous decision, the Delaware Supreme Court rejected the claim, affirmed the Business Judgment Rule,
158

See Kenneth R. Davis, Cash of the Titans: Arbitrating Challenges to Executive Compensation, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 245, 252–53 (2014); Randall S. Thomas & Harwell Wells, Executive Compensation in the Courts: Board Capture, Optimal Contracting, and Officers’ Fiduciary Duties, 95 MINN. L. REV. 846, 865, 877–78 (2011).
159 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872–73 (Del. 1985); Aronson v. Lewis, 473
A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
160 Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1,
29 (2006); see also Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in
Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1, 26 (2005); Peter C. Kostant, Meaningful
Good Faith: Managerial Motives and the Duty to Obey the Law, 55 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV.
421, 425–26 (2011); Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 486
(2004).
161 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 35 (Del. 2006).
162 Id. at 35–37.
163 Id. at 35. In hiring Mr. Ovitz, the board approved an employment agreement that included a generous non-fault termination provision. When Ovitz failed to perform up to expectations in his new position, the board terminated his employment without cause. Id. at 41, 45–
46.
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and de facto refused to substantively second guess the compensation package
for reasonableness. In particular, the Court refused to scrutinize the compensation package afforded to Mr. Ovitz on the merits because the executive compensation decision-making process followed by the Disney Board was informed.164
The practical import of taking into account comparable corporate executive
compensation in assessing the reasonableness of in-house lawyers’ compensation is that arguably unreasonable corporate executive compensation, or, at
least, corporate executive compensation not subject to a reasonableness constraint, will inform and shape the notion of in-house lawyers’ reasonable pay.
In other words, taking account of corporate executive compensation in assessing the reasonableness of in-house lawyers’ pay allows the unreasonable
(or at least the possibly unreasonable) to shape and inform what’s reasonable.
This challenge, compelling as it may be, reveals complex insights about inhouse lawyers, their identities, practice realities, professional status within the
profession and their entity-clients, and the corresponding difficulties of regulating them effectively within the Rules’ gamut. On the one hand, ignoring corporate executive compensation in assessing the reasonableness of in-house lawyers’ pay means ignoring a materially relevant aspect of what it is that in-house
lawyers do and how to assess the value they generate and the compensation
they deserve. On the other hand, acknowledging the relevance of corporate executive compensation in assessing the reasonableness of in-house lawyers’ pay
may pull the rug from underneath the entire professional commitment to a reasonableness requirement on lawyers’ fees by injecting into the professional calculus, if only as one relevant factor, the arguably unreasonable and excessive
tint of corporate executive compensation.
Moreover, opening the door to insights from corporate executive compensation meant to inform and guide the reasonableness analysis of in-house lawyers’ compensation may counterintuitively introduce more uncertainty than
predictability. For example, one commentator notes, “[a]s part of the recruiting
process, some corporate executives are offered . . . employment agreements
that provide them with severance in the event of their termination without
cause. . . . Is there any industry standard for the term of severance payments . . .
164

Id. at 52, 67–68. While the Court did acknowledge at least three categories of failure to
act in good faith, where the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of advancing the best interests of the corporation, where the fiduciary acts with the intent to violate applicable positive law, and where the fiduciary intentionally fails to act in the face of a
known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for his duties, id. at 67, and noted
that a plaintiff could rebut the Business Judgment Rule by showing that the board of directors acted in bad faith, id. at 52, it found that the Disney board did not violate its duty of
good faith when it approved Mr. Ovitz’s employment agreement, terminated Ovitz without
cause, and approved the payment of his severance package. Id. at 52, 67–68. For a comprehensive overview of the case and of the duty of good faith, see Stephen M. Bainbridge et al.,
The Convergence of Good Faith and Oversight, 55 UCLA L. REV. 559, 582 (2008); Jonathan Macey, The Nature of Conflicts of Interest Within the Firm, 31 J. CORP. L. 613, 631
(2006).
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? . . . [T]here is no industry standard.”165 If no industry standard exists in the
corporate world for severance in the event of termination without cause, inserting this (non)standard to the assessment of in-house lawyers’ severance packages may cloud rather than clarify the analysis.
Nonetheless, in the context of in-house pay, “the fee customarily charged
in the locality for similar legal services,”166 ought to be interpreted to include
the fee and salary customarily charged and commanded by comparable outside
counsel and corporate executives who provide similar legal and nonlegal services.
Construing the reasonableness factors of Rule 1.5(a) sensibly, recognizing
that the analysis ought to take into account the evolving practice realities of inhouse lawyers to avoid imposing an impractical standard blind to the work,
roles, and challenges faced by in-house counsel, is not tantamount to reducing
the reasonableness requirement to no standard at all. To be sure, the point of the
inquiry is not a sham meant to legitimize and justify any and all in-house pay,
that is, to impose a reasonableness requirement on in-house lawyers only to
then expand the definition of reasonableness to essentially allow any compensation package to withstand scrutiny. As we have seen, the same policy rationales that explain and account for the reasonableness constraint on the fees of
outside counsel apply to in-house pay. Interpreting the meaning of reasonableness sensibly, with an eye toward the realities of in-house practice, does not
erode the importance of subjecting in-house pay to an objective reasonableness
standard, in stark contrast to the no-substantive-scrutiny approach generally
taken by courts with regard to executive compensation.
The two-part in-house pay inquiry undertaken in Part I of this Article—
exploring the applicability of the reasonableness requirement of Rule 1.5(a) to
in-house salaries, bonuses and nonmonetary benefits, and examining the meaning of reasonableness—reveals profound insights regarding the transformation
of law practice in the twenty-first century, the decline of the lawyerprofessional and the rise of the lawyer-employee, as well as the lawyerbusinessperson. These developments must be considered before the ABA rushes to address the regulatory ambiguity surrounding in-house pay.
II. IN-HOUSE PAY AS THE OPENING SHOT IN THE CLASS WAR BETWEEN
LAWYER-PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYER-EMPLOYEES
The conclusion that Rule 1.5(a)’s reasonableness requirement applies to inhouse pay does not stand for the assertion, and should not be construed to
mean, that all the rules of professional conduct apply to all lawyer-employees.
Part I.A.’s conclusion cannot be generalized because it depends not only on the
plain language of Rule 1.5(a) and its intent and rationales, but also, as we have
seen, on the status of in-house lawyers as powerful lawyer-employees, their
165

John Okray & Diana Lai, Hiring and Compensation Trends for In-House Counsel, FED.
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role as professionals and fiduciaries, the identity of their clients, and the nature
of the legal services they provide. This seemingly obvious caveat—statutory
interpretation depends on language, intent, rationales and context—and its ostensibly obvious application—one should not assume automatically that all the
rules of professional conduct apply to all lawyer-employees—nonetheless undermines two longstanding cornerstones of the legal profession. Acknowledging that different lawyers, such as lawyer-employees as opposed to lawyerprofessionals, have different status, perform different tasks and roles, and offer
different types of legal services to clients, undercuts the One Profession myth
that the organized bar has long labored to cultivate and sustain.167 It also questions the wisdom of the ABA’s one-size-fits-all regulatory approach, pursuant
to which one set of rules of professional conduct should apply to all lawyers.168
Thus, the rise of in-house lawyers as part of a new class of lawyer-employees
and the statutory interpretation inquiries that this new class of lawyers triggers
under the Rules (such as the application of Rule 1.5(a) to in-house pay or Rule
5.6(a) to in-house noncompetes) reveal important questions about the future of
the legal profession that the organized bar and all lawyers must begin to grapple with.
A. The Past: The One Profession Myth and the Corresponding One-Size-FitsAll Regulatory Approach
In the United States, the legal profession has long adhered to the idea of the
one unified profession with the corresponding commitment of the Rules to regulate lawyers pursuant to a one-size-fits-all approach.169 Historically, the underpinnings of this commitment were well grounded and documented. In its infancy, as lawyers were seeking recognition as a profession,170 the notion of the
One Profession was both necessary and accurate, indeed, through the nineteenth century the profession was largely homogenous, consisting predominantly of White-Anglo-Saxon-Protestant (WASP), middle- and upper-class men,
engaged in general law practice centered upon litigation.171 To be sure, this
homogeneity was the product of explicit discrimination and the exclusion of
minorities and women attorneys, but the profession was homogeneous nonetheless.172 Thus, by the early twentieth century, the ABA Canons, codifying the
167

Wald, Resizing the Rules of Professional Conduct, supra note 61, at 231-5.
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169 See supra text accompanying notes 60–63.
170 RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 18–30 (1989) (exploring the profession’s struggle to control the market for legal services) [hereinafter ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS].
171 WAYNE K. HOBSON, THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL
SOCIETY 1890–1930 114–15 (1986); JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN
LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 255 (1950).
172 JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN
AMERICA 4 (1976); ERWIN O. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER: PROFESSIONAL
ORGANIZATION MAN? 44–47 (1964); Eli Wald, The Rise and Fall of the WASP and Jewish
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universal identity of the bar along the cornerstones of litigation as the paradigmatic law practice, the hired gun client-centered ideology, and lawyers as autonomous individual professionals, men, and WASP;173 were historically accurate, reflective of the initial fears against immigrants, Catholics, and Jewish
men (and later women and minorities), as well as against the rise of law firms,
which threatened the then-dominant model of gentlemanly law practice.174 In
other words, deep into the twentieth century the One Profession approach was
not a myth but rather a reality.
This professionalism project, aided by the organized bar’s promulgation
and enforcement of rules of professional conduct based on the Canons, was
immensely successful in establishing lawyers as professionals. By the mid1950s, attorneys’ elite status as lawyer-professionals, individuals who exercise
discretion and common wisdom on behalf of clients; benefit from professional
prerogatives others do not possess and cannot offer to clients like confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege; entitled to handsome compensation for their
services; and regarded as a social and cultural governing class, was never seriously challenged or threatened.175 And, although the bar was unable to use its
professional status to restrict access to its ranks and prevent newcomers from
entering the profession,176 it has used its newfound prestige and status to expand its influence, power, and monopoly during the New Deal era and the rise
of the administrative state,177 as well as to defeat attempts to curb its selfregulation and monopoly over the provision of legal services.178
Post-World War II, the twentieth century featured, inter alia, two interlocking trends: the immense growth in the size of the bar and its diversity, and
increased stratification. As the number of lawyers grew exponentially to gradually include women lawyers as well as minorities,179 and the practice of law
broadened to include new areas of practice,180 the profession has become in173
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creasingly stratified, with BigLaw lawyers in the corporate hemisphere, mostly
white men (although no longer exclusively WASP) rising to the top, and women, minorities, and others concentrated in the lower ranks of the corporate hemisphere and in the individual hemisphere.181
Lawyers’ rules of professional conduct, first transitioning from the Canons
into the Model Code and then to the Rules,182 have by and large ignored these
trends and adhered to a one-size-fits-all approach centered on the traditional
cornerstones of the profession for three interrelated reasons.183 First, this approach served the interests of the powerful elite atop the profession. A seemingly universal merit-based approach, shaped in the image of white WASP
men, protected this constituency from threats from women lawyers and others,
for example, by generating new professional ideologies such as hypercompetitiveness to legitimize and justify the status quo of the profession.184
Second, and ironically, the one-size-fits-all approach has served the interests of all lawyers, including women and minorities. While internally, within
the profession, the universal approach held newcomers into the profession
back; externally, vis-à-vis nonlawyer competitors, ranging from accounting
firms and multidisciplinary providers earlier in the second half of the twentieth
century, to nonlawyer legal providers and global providers later, the universal
approach served to protect the interests of the entire profession from outside
competition.185 The One Profession, increasingly a myth given the immense
size and diversity of the bar, nonetheless allowed all lawyers to claim professional status and exclude rising competitors. To that end, the Rules adhered to
the one-size-fits-all approach, introducing patch after patch, mostly in response
to the demise of litigation as the prominent embodiment of law practice.186
Third, alternatives to the universal approach have proven hard to come by.
While exposing the litigation, hired gun, male WASP, and individualistic biases of the Rules was easy enough to do,187 coming up with satisfactory alternatives has proven much harder, for both conceptual and practical reasons. Con181

HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 58, at 10–11; HEINZ ET AL., supra note 58, at 319; Jo
Dixon & Carroll Seron, Stratification in the Legal Profession: Sex, Sector, and Salary, 29
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REV. 2509, 2517–18 (2015); Wald, Glass Ceilings and Dead Ends, supra note 133, at 2273.
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Responsibility for Real Professionals, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE: LAWYERS’ ROLES,
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION, 207, 210 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000).
186 See generally Most Recent Changes to the Model Rules, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.
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247, 251, 253.
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ceptually, envisioning an alternative universal approach is not a straightforward
proposition. Consider the male WASP bias of the Rules. On the one hand, revising the Rules to reduce their macho, aggressive, zealous, combative, twentyfour-seven impulses seems appealing enough.188 Moreover, acknowledging the
impact of facets of lawyers’ increasingly diverse personal identities on their
professional identities would be both warranted and desirable.189 On the other
hand, one would certainly be concerned about gender-specific references that
would smack of a discriminatory “different rules for different lawyers” mindset
and imply that gender might have something to do with one’s professional abilities as a lawyer. Elsewhere, I advocated for an alternative universal approach,
univertext rules, which take account of context without essentializing lawyers,
but the political will to undertake and push for such a massive undertaking has
not materialized.190 Practically, some have called for supplementing the Rules
with specific codes meant to address the unique features of particular practice
areas, but concerns have risen about jurisdictional disputes between codes, enforceability, as well as the ability to regulate lawyers with diverse practices.191
The twenty-first century has complicated the picture even further. Inequality within the profession has never been greater with lawyers at the top taking
advantage of structural changes in the practice of law after the Great Recession
of 2008–2009, and of the emergence of new tracks and tiers of practice, to cement their elite position atop the profession.192 At the same time, as David Wilkins has pointed out, several trends such as the growing use of technology and
globalization suggest the erosion of the traditional divide between the corporate
and individual hemispheres and a natural organic return to a state of One Profession.193 This blurring of the divide between the traditional hemispheres and
the possibility, inherent in it, of greater uniformity within the profession may
serve to reduce the probability, not high to begin with, of generating the necessary political will within the profession to revise the Rules. Consequently, a
188
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well-intending ABA finds it hard to amend the Rules beyond relatively noncontroversial changes such as addressing the threats of cybersecurity to the practice
of law.194
B. The Rise of a New Class of Lawyer-Employees
Against this already complex background, the rise of a class of lawyeremployees, including in-house counsel, threatens and undermines the very
premise of the One Profession myth and its regulatory one-size-fits-all counterpart by questioning, for the first time, the assumption of lawyers, all lawyers, as
individual autonomous powerful professionals.
The new class of lawyer-employees consists of at least half a dozen constituents. In addition to in-house lawyers who are employees of their entity clients, the class includes associates at law firms. Associates have always been,
technically, law firm employees, yet recent developments in the practice of law
have eroded their status. Historically, law firms featured only two classes of
lawyers, associates and partners, with a third class, of counsel, essentially designating retired partners.195 The proliferation of tracks and classes of lawyers at
law firms, and, in particular, the splitting of the partner track into equity and
income tiers,196 have meant not only the extension of the time law firm lawyers
194

See the recent amendment to Rule 1.6, adding a requirement to guard confidentiality
against cybersecurity threats. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(c) cmt. 18 (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2019); Eli Wald, Legal Ethics’ Next Frontier: Lawyers and Cybersecurity, 19 CHAP.
L. REV. 501, 501–03 (2016). A notable exception has been the ABA’s recent amendment of
Rule 8.4(g) to deem as professional misconduct discriminatory conduct in the practice of
law. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g). Unsurprisingly, the amendment has
been heavily criticized and has not been adopted by a majority of the states. See Whether
Adoption of ABA Rule 8.4(g) Constitutes a Violation of an Attorney’s Rights, KP-0123 Op.
Att’y Gen. 3 (2016), https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/opinions/51paxton/op/
2016/kp0123.pdf [https://perma.cc/X63X-U23B]; Letter from Alan Wilson, Att’y Gen. of
S.C., to Hon. John R. McCravy III, Rep., S.C. House of Reps. (May 1, 2016),
http://2hsvz0l74ah31vgcm16peuy12tz.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/
05/McCravy-J.-OS-10143-FINAL-Opinion-5-1-2017-01331464xD2C7801336400xD2C78
.pdf. [https://perma.cc/55E8-YTJ8]; Josh Blackman, Reply: A Pause for State Courts Considering Model Rule 8.4(g), 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241, 265 (2017); Stephen Gillers, A
Rule to Forbid Bias and Harassment in Law Practice: A Guide for State Courts Considering
Model Rule 8.4(g), 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 195, 198, 218 (2017); Ron Rotunda, The ABA
Overrules the First Amendment, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 16, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
the-aba-overrules-the-first-amendment-1471388418 [https://perma.cc/NUR4-D3DW]; Eugene Volokh, A Speech Code for Lawyers, Banning Viewpoints that Express ‘Bias,’ Including in Law-Related Social Activities, WASH. POST (Aug. 10, 2016), https://www.washington
post.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/08/10/a-speech-code-for-lawyers-banning-view
points-that-express-bias-including-in-law-related-social-activities2/?utm_term=.5cdab79ac
1bc [https://perma.cc/NP65-TD9W]. But see, Rebecca Aviel, Rule 8.4(g) and the First
Amendment: Distinguishing Between Discrimination and Free Speech, 31 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 31, 76 (2018).
195 See MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 28–29 (1991).
196 Bernard A. Burk, What’s New About the New Normal: The Evolving Market for New
Lawyers in the 21st Century, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 541, 588–89 (2014); Douglas R. Rich-
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spend in statuses other than equity partner but the devaluation of the associate
rank. An associate is no longer a member of the second-ranked class of lawyers
at a law firm with two classes, she is at best a member of the third-ranked class,
and at firms that have broken up their associate class into junior, middle, and
senior tiers based on competencies and expectancies, even worse than that.197
While historically most associates did not make (equity) partner, making
partner was the formal expectation and the official result of the tournament of
lawyers for all associates, and law firms helped place the “losers”, those who
did not make partner, in positions of relative high status and pay.198 Increased
mobility as the “new normal” reality at law firms has changed that expectation.
When most associates expect to laterally move between law firms, do not expect to make partner or to reap professional rewards and status akin to making
partner, and do not expect to display loyalty or receive the benefits of it from
their law firms, their status as lawyer-employees as opposed to lawyerprofessionals-in-the-making is amplified,199 reflected, for example, in calls for
them to unionize.200
Next, the class of lawyer-employees includes income (or salaried) partners,
who, other than by empty title, share many employment features with associates. They are compensated by means of a salary rather than a share of the law
firm’s profits, shoulder no risk of loss, and have no rights in management.201
While recent scholarly attention has been focused on the status of income partners as employees for purposes of their ability to file Title VII antidiscrimination lawsuits,202 these lawyer-employees are generally employees rather than partners in terms of their authority, discretion, and status within law
firms.

mond, The Partnership Paradigm and Law Firm Non-Equity Partners, 58 U. KAN. L. REV.
507, 509 (2010) [hereinafter Richmond, The Partnership Paradigm]; Joyce S. Sterling &
Nancy Reichman, Navigating the Gap: Reflections on 20 Years Researching Gender Disparities in the Legal Profession, 8 FIU L. REV. 515, 522 (2013); Joan C. Williams & Veta Richardson, New Millennium, Same Glass Ceiling? The Impact of Law Firm Compensation Systems on Women, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 616, 624 (2011).
197 See Neil Hamilton, Law Firm Competency Models & Student Professional Success:
Building on a Foundation of Professional Formation/Professionalism, 11 U. ST. THOMAS
L.J. 6, 8–14 (2013).
198 See, e.g., PAUL HOFFMAN, LIONS IN THE STREET: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE GREAT WALL
STREET LAW FIRMS 159–61 (1973).
199 David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers: Tracking,
Seeding, and Information Control in the Internal Labor Markets of Elite Law Firms, 84 VA.
L. REV. 1581, 1611, 1611 n.113, 1650 (1998).
200 Melissa Mortazavi, Lawyers, Not Widgets: Why Private-Sector Attorneys Must Unionize
to Save the Legal Profession, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1482, 1543 (2012).
201 Richmond, The Partnership Paradigm, supra note 196, at 518; David B. Wilkins, Partner, Shmartner! EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1264, 1266
(2007) [hereinafter Partner Shmartner].
202 Thomas F. Cochrane, Partners Are Individuals: Applying Title VII to Female Partners in
Large Law Firms, 65 UCLA L. REV. 488, 495 (2018); see also Randall J. Gingiss, Partners
as Common Law Employees, 28 IND. L. REV. 21, 22 (1994).

284

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:1

The lawyer-employee class also includes staff attorneys, lawyer-employees
at law firms, who are not considered partnership-track material and have no
meaningful possibility of promotion.203 This category of “permanent associates” includes both experienced attorneys who have been taken off the partnership track,204 and less experienced lawyers who are given low-grade assignments such as document review and due diligence tasks, and usually receive
low hourly pay and few if any benefits.205 Notably, as lawyer-employees, staff
attorneys are far removed from the historical ideal of the lawyer-professional.
Unlike associates and income partners who in meaningful ways are still powerful professionals, staff attorneys resemble more traditional weak-employees in
orientation and status in the workplace.
Further along the lawyer-employee/lawyer-professional continuum are
temporary and contract lawyers.206 Indeed, temporary lawyers are often not
employees at all but rather independent-contractors who possess little professional status. Often employed not by law firms but rather by placement agencies, temporary lawyers tend to assist law firms with short-term projects or
surge in demand for low-grade tasks.
In the past few years, large law firms have begun employing temporary attorneys, at hourly rates with no benefits, to perform low-level legal tasks, such as
large-scale document reviews and coding. The depressing reports, keyed in by
temporary attorney bloggers, read more like an account of pre-Lochner era
working conditions than a professional, autonomous work environment. The
anonymous temporary attorney bloggers tell stories of spending long hours in
front of computer screens reviewing and coding documents in dreggy basement
workspaces with dead cockroaches on the floor, blocked exits, and overflowing
bathrooms. Workers must obtain permission to use the bathroom and are not allowed to leave the premises to, for instance, walk outside to get a cup of coffee,
unless it is during the forty-five minute lunch time allocation. Temporary attorneys do not do legal research, they do not go to court, and do not ever meet with
clients. The attorneys who take these temporary jobs graduated from low-tier institutions and do not have the academic credentials to acquire jobs as associates
at the large law firms.207

203

See Douglas R. Richmond, The Contemporary Legal Environment and Employment
Claims Against Law Firms, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 471, 481–82 (2011).
204 Gary Munneke, Race to the Finish Line: Legal Education, Jobs and the Stuff Dreams Are
Made of, 84 N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J. 10, 13 (2012).
205 THOMAS S. CLAY & ERIC A. SEEGER, LAW FIRMS IN TRANSITION: AN ALTMAN WEIL
FLASH SURVEY iii (2017); Jason G. Dykstra, Beyond the “Practice Ready” Buzz: Sifting
Through the Disruption of the Legal Industry to Divine the Skills Needed by New Attorneys,
11 DREXEL L. REV. 149, 180–81 (2018).
206 Thomas Ross, Tomorrow, and Tomorrow, and Tomorrow: Ethics 20/20 Amidst a Changing Profession, 47 AKRON L. REV. 51, 55 (2014) (describing BigLaw’s increased use of temporary and contract lawyers).
207 Lucille A. Jewel, Bourdieu and American Legal Education: How Law Schools Reproduce Social Stratification and Class Hierarchy, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 1155, 1188–89 (2008) (citations omitted).
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To be sure, the spread of such temporary or contingent employment is not
unique to law or the legal profession.208 Yet, within the legal profession, the
rise of contract and temporary lawyering is significant because it reflects the
erosion of professional status and rise of the lawyer-employee as an alternative
model to the traditional lawyer-professional.209 As noted by Lucille Jewel,
“[w]ith temporary attorneys, large law firms appear to have created a new lawyer underclass that greatly conflicts with the idea that attorneys are members of
a noble, autonomous profession.”210
Finally, the class of lawyer-employees and independent-contractors includes outsourced attorneys. This latter category often consists of foreign
common law attorneys who work for either “affiliated” foreign law firms of
U.S. firms or for foreign placement agencies and typically provide low-grade
legal services off-site (and out-of-sight).211
There are many differences between the various constituents of the lawyeremployee class, especially between staff, temporary and outsourced lawyers on
the one hand, and in-house, associate, and income partner lawyers on the other,
but importantly they all share one key feature. As lawyer-employees, they are
increasingly removed from the defining characteristic of lawyers, all lawyers,
as individual autonomous independent powerful professionals.
A constitutive definitional cornerstone of the lawyer-professional has been
that lawyers qua lawyers, at the core of what they do as lawyers, have the autonomy, power, and discretion to exercise independent, individualized professional judgment over the intellectual aspects of their jobs, that is, to exercise
practical wisdom on behalf of clients.212 In this sense, lawyers have long been
powerful vis-à-vis their clients, deploying independent autonomous judgment
over a sphere of knowledge and skill clients knew little about.213 Such exercise
of individual, autonomous independent discretion has resulted in the acquisition
of status, professional status, which distinguished and defined the lawyerprofessional as a unique service provider.214
208

Gillian Lester, Careers and Contingency, 51 STAN. L. REV. 73, 77 (1998).
Leslie A. Gordon, Overworked, Seeking Overtime: Contract Lawyers Push for Better
Pay, 103 A.B.A. J. 10, 10 (2017) (“Because they’re not employees, contract attorneys have
no benefits or job security, are sometimes relegated to basement-style working conditions,
and are typically unemployed between projects. While they perform tedious tasks such as
coding documents, they acquire no new skills, have no opportunities for promotion and experience little intellectual stimulation. ‘The oligarchs are turning us—as they did to workers
in the 19th-century steel and textile factories—into disposable human beings,’ Bufithis wrote
on his site in March 2016.”); see also Deborah Jones Merritt, What Happened to the Class of
2010? Empirical Evidence of Structural Change in the Legal Profession, 2015 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 1043, 1107 (2015).
210 Jewel, supra note 207, at 1189.
211 Milton C. Regan, Jr. & Palmer T. Heenan, Supply Chains and Porous Boundaries: The
Disaggregation of Legal Services, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2137, 2188–89 (2010).
212 KRONMAN, supra note 175, at 130–33; Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers,
68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988).
213 Wasserstrom, supra note 84, at 16.
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To be sure, the individual-autonomous-independent-powerful assumption
is not and has long not been an absolute “set in stone” definition of all lawyers’
roles and practices. In the individual hemisphere there are certainly the Mutos
of the world, immigration lawyers trying to balance an impossibly heavy caseload of clients they hardly know while being squeezed by so-called “travel
agencies” who supply the clients and influence, if not dominate, the lawyers’
practice.215 Yet paradigmatic solo and small-firm practitioners, notwithstanding
the undeniable challenges inherent in their practice, have continued in a meaningful way to exercise power and status as professionals vis-à-vis their typically
vulnerable clients, such as disenfranchised criminal defendants facing incarceration, immigrants facing deportation, and tenants facing eviction.216
Similarly, in the corporate hemisphere, large law firm partners have lost
power and influence to in-house lawyers and their corporate clients, and exercise decreased professional autonomy within their own firms, which in turn exercise greater centralized control over decision-making.217 Yet, BigLaw equity
partners continue to benefit from elevated status within the profession and notwithstanding their relative loss of power and influence to in-house counsel,
they benefit from top compensation and prestige.218
Some lawyer-employees, in contrast, fundamentally contradict inherent
facets of the autonomous powerful professional assumption. Staff and contract
lawyers, as we have seen, have very little, if any, autonomy as lawyers over the
exercise of professional judgment and over questions of intellectual appeal that
call for the use of practical wisdom. Performing low-grade tasks, they are hardly ever in a position to exercise meaningful professional judgment over questions of significance, and their work product is closely supervised by other
lawyers, typically associates. These lawyer-employees are often weak in every
aspect of their practice vis-à-vis other lawyers and clients. With regard to other
lawyers, lawyer-employees practice in highly hierarchal environments: their
work product is vertically scrutinized with no meaningful opportunities for
growth and development in responsibilities, and they often receive little training and no mentorship. Furthermore, staff and contract lawyer-employees typically have very little to no contact with clients,219 indeed, sometimes clients are
215

RICHARD L. ABEL, LAWYERS IN THE DOCK: LEARNING FROM ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY
PROCEEDINGS 165–68 (2008) (examining the conduct of Joseph Muto, an immigration law
attorney who was disbarred for neglecting clients, assisting in the unauthorized practice of
law by nonlawyers, and mismanaging his escrow account); Richard L. Abel, Practicing Immigration Law in Filene’s Basement, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1449, 1488 (2006); see, Leslie C. Levin, Guardians at the Gate: The Backgrounds, Career Paths, and Professional Development
of Private US Immigration Lawyers, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 399, 403 (2009).
216 WILKINS, Everyday Practice is the Troubling Case, supra note 56, at 68, 70–73.
217 See, e.g., Anthony E. Davis, Legal Ethics and Risk Management: Complementary Visions of Lawyer Regulation, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 95, 104 (2008); Milton C. Regan, Jr.,
Risky Business, 94 GEO. L.J. 1957, 1958 (2006); Wilkins, Team of Rivals?, supra note 32, at
2071.
218 Bruch, supra note 192.
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unaware of the existence or role of some staff, temporary, and outsourced attorneys.220 Lacking the core constitutive characteristics of professionalism,
lawyer-employees as a class thus represent a challenge to the very traditional
understanding of lawyers as professionals and the practice of law as a profession. Notably, this challenge is not only real, it is likely permanent: structural
changes and the creation of new tracks within the profession suggest that lawyer-employees are here to stay.221
Interestingly, while the growing class of lawyer-employees threatens the
professional status of the profession as a whole and raises intriguing questions
about the regulation of lawyers, it has not yet affected the status of lawyeremployees externally vis-à-vis the public. To the extent that many in the public
do not have an accurate appreciation of what it is that lawyers do and, in particular, of the differences, for example, between equity partners, income partners,
associates, and staff attorneys at a law firm, they may continue to confer on all
lawyers, including lawyer-employees, the elevated status of lawyerprofessionals.222 This phenomenon, described by Meir Dan-Cohan as acoustic
separation,223 may be temporary. Unlike some aspects of the law and of law
practice that lay members of the public may be unable to observe, key features
of the status of lawyer-employees, such as their relative low pay and lack of
benefits and job insecurity will become, over time, visible.
It is somewhat ironic, and possibly quite misleading, that early scholarly
reaction to the rise of lawyer-employees has focused on income partners and
associates at BigLaw,224 as well as on in-house lawyers as employees.225 To be
clear, the bifurcation of the traditional partner status into equity (read “real”)
and income partners is a significant phenomenon with tangible consequences
worthy of investigation.226 Similarly, the work conditions of BigLaw associates
deserve scrutiny.227 Yet, income partners and BigLaw associates, the many
challenges that face them notwithstanding, continue to benefit from relative
elite status within the profession and certainly enjoy handsome pay.228 More
importantly, they continue to meet some aspects of the fundamental assumption
220

See, e.g., Use of Temporary Lawyers and Other Professionals Not Admitted to Practice
Law in Colorado (“Outsourcing”), 121 COLO. BAR ASS’N 4-439, 4-445 (2009).
221 Merritt, supra note 209, at 1102.
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of professionalism—they are autonomous, relatively powerful, professionals.
Put differently, income partners and BigLaw associates do feature some characteristics of being employees, but they are, relatively speaking, powerful employees. Thinking of them as the paradigmatic face of the lawyer-employees
class is thus misleading and risks diverting attention from the plight of weak
lawyer-employees. Similarly, in-house lawyers, while certainly employees of
their entity-clients in the conventional sense of an employer-employee relationship, are for the most part powerful employees who retain many of the traditional core aspects of lawyer-professionals, such that focusing on them as an
exemplar of lawyer-employees may be distracting with regard to the challenges
of weak lawyer-employees.
The rise of the lawyer-employee class raises at least two important questions about the future of the legal profession and its regulation. Can the profession responsibly and morally adhere to the myth of the One Profession in the
face of practice realities that reveal the growing gap between lawyerprofessionals and lawyer-employees? The question, to be sure, is anything but
academic. Consider the implications for legal education. It is one thing to require a law degree that costs hundreds of thousands of dollars and takes seven
years to pursue as a condition precedent for obtaining a license to practice law
when “in America the law is King[,]”229 and when most lawyers, at least over
time, become members of the governing class,230 a de facto aristocracy,231 and
highly compensated professionals.232 It is altogether a different proposition
when some lawyers are destined to become lawyer-employees, with low status,
low pay, and job insecurity, not to mention crippling debt.233
Or consider the implications for the monopoly of the legal profession over
the provision of legal services. Some attention has been given as of late to the
question of whether some lawyers can opt out of the lawyer-professional identity for the purpose of rejecting certain professional obligations and with them
229

THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE (1776), reprinted in SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS
PAINE 6, 31 (Ian Shapiro & Jane E. Calvert eds., 2014) (observing “that in America The Law
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230 See Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers as America’s Governing Class: The Formation and Dissolution of the Original Understanding of the American Lawyer’s Role, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH.
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HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 51, 51–74 (Gerald W. Gawalt ed.,
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231 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 253–61 (Henry Reeve trans., Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2003) (discussing the status of lawyers as America’s aristocracy).
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Law Degree, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 249, 251–52 (2014).
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corresponding professional prerogatives,234 whereas other commentators have
wondered about the ability of the legal profession to protect its turf against
nonlawyer competitors and technology offering legal services.235 The rise of
the lawyer-employee class, however, presents a related yet distinctively different question: must the legal profession, responsibly and morally, cede ground
and de-regulate at least low-grade tasks to allow for greater competition and
address some of the reasons that have given rise to the new class of lawyeremployees?
With regard to regulation, can the ABA responsibly and morally adhere to
the Rules’ one-size-fits-all approach? In the words of the Chism court, lawyeremployees present a question “at the intersection of judicial power over the
practice of law and legislative power over the conditions of employment.”236
Whereas the Rules purport to guide the conduct of lawyers and regulate it in the
public interest and to the benefit of clients and the public, “the legislature has
passed extensive legislation with the purpose of protecting employee wages . . .
against any diminution or deduction . . . [and] to prevent abuses by employers
. . . reflect[ing] the legislature’s strong policy in favor of payment of wages to
employees.”237 Insisting on a one-size-fits-all regulatory approach in the face of
a rising class of lawyer-employees, and, specifically, subjecting lawyeremployees to the Rules, amounts to a decision to favor judicial power over legislative power when it comes to lawyer-employees’ rights and obligations. This
is not a decision that the ABA (and courts) necessarily have the power to make,
and in any event, it is not a decision that the ABA (and courts) should make
casually.
C. In-House Pay, Lawyer-Employees, Lawyer-Professionals and the Future of
the Legal Profession
The regulation of in-house pay, viewed from the perspective of the growing divide between lawyer-professionals and lawyer-employees, provides a
compelling example of the risks inherent in ignoring the sea change in the practice of law. Against this background, the construction of “fees” in Rule 1.5(a)
to encompass in-house lawyers’ salaries, bonuses and nonmonetary benefits
takes on a whole new meaning, as it would open the door to allow courts and
the Rules to have a say in the regulation of employee salaries. In this sense, the
issue of in-house compensation is but a symptom of a seismic change effecting
not only the Rules and regulation of lawyers but indeed the conception and
meaning of lawyers as professionals and of the legal profession.
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In-house pay is a real, timely question in need of addressing. Amending the
Rules or interpreting them sensibly to subject in-house compensation to a reasonableness requirement as construed above is the right thing to do, as long as
we avoid the folly of regulating powerful lawyer-employees as if they represent
the typical lawyer-employees, setting a dangerous precedent for the regulation
of weak lawyer-employees; understand the impact of regulating in-house lawyers on all lawyers; and begin to address the challenges facing weak lawyeremployees.
First, it is imperative to remember that in-house lawyers are powerful lawyer-employees, a subgroup of lawyer-employee that is the exception to the
class in that it much resembles lawyer-professionals such as equity partners as
opposed to traditional weak lawyer-employees. This quality of in-house lawyers both explains why it is appropriate to subject them to Rule 1.5(a)’s reasonableness requirement and why it may not be appropriate to subject other, weak,
lawyer-employees to the Rule. This concern, to be sure, is far from academic.
Consider the initial anecdotal evidence from the marketplace indicating that inhouse legal departments are hiring contract lawyers.238 If a new class of inhouse contract lawyers emerges following the model of BigLaw contract lawyers, featuring low-level legal tasks, hourly rates, and no benefits,239 then automatically subjecting these weak lawyer-employees to Rule 1.5(a)’s reasonableness would be inappropriate and undesirable. It will allow entity-clients to
use 1.5(a)’s reasonableness requirement, meant to protect them as a shield
against powerful abusive lawyer-professionals, as a sword against weak lawyer-employees, legitimizing what Lucille Jewel has called “Lochner era working conditions.”240 And it will indirectly allow courts, exercising power over
the practice of law, to infringe on traditional “legislative power over the conditions of employment.”241
Similarly, one should not infer from the regulation of in-house pay that all
the rules of professional conduct should apply to all lawyer-employees. Consider Rule 1.10 and Brown v. Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles.242 Rule 1.10(a) generally imputes a conflict of interest from one
lawyer to another lawyer “associated in a firm,” such that if one lawyer is tainted by a conflict of interest, all lawyers in the firms are disqualified by the same
conflict.243 Brown explored the novel question of whether conflicts of interest
238
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can be imputed from a contract or outsourced attorney to the employing law
firm. As an Assistant Attorney General for the Office of the Attorney General
of the State of Florida (“OAG”), attorney Moore represented the Defendant, the
Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (“DHSMV”), in its
case against Plaintiff, Ms. Brown. After leaving her employment at OAG, Ms.
Moore took employment as a contract attorney with the very law firm that has
been representing Plaintiff against DHSMV. Defendant promptly moved to
disqualify Plaintiff’s counsel arguing that Ms. Moore’s conflict of interest
should be imputed to the firm.244 Notably, the court interpreted the term of art
associated in a firm in Rule 1.10 to mean that the lawyer in question must be a
traditional associate rather than a contract attorney. Accordingly, the court held
that conflicts of interest cannot be imputed from a contract attorney to a law
firm.245 Notably, several ethics opinions considering the imputation of a temporary contract lawyer’s conflicts to a hiring firm under versions of Rule 1.10 focused on the temporary lawyer’s access to the firm’s confidential client information,246 yet even these opinions considered the status of the temporary
lawyer as a relevant factor in deciding the imputation question.247
Second, even if one remains diligent not to construe the application of Rule
1.5(a)’s reasonableness requirement to in-house pay broadly to mean either that
all lawyer-employees should be subject to a reasonableness constraint or that
all the rules of professional conduct apply to all lawyer-employees, regulating
in-house pay still has profound impact on the regulation of all lawyers.
Recall the proposed amendment to Rule 5.6(a), pursuant to which in-house
lawyers may be a party to a reasonable noncompete provision as part of a stock
grant or stock option agreement.248 The amendment may be necessary to address the practice realities of in-house lawyers, nonetheless, it contradicts the
one-size-fits-all commitment of the Rules in that it curve a special exception
from the noncompete prohibition for in-house lawyers. To be sure, the Rules on
244

Brown, WL 4758150 at *1.
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‘associated’ with the firm. Thus, for example, a firm can outsource research or other support
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246 See, e.g., Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, 715 N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N 3-98 (1999); Professional
Responsibility for Temporary Contract Lawyers and the Firms that Hire Them, 352 D.C.
BAR (2010).
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occasion treat different lawyers differently. For example, Rule 3.3 imposes
special disclosure duties on trial attorneys and litigators,249 and Rule 3.8 imposes special responsibilities on prosecutors.250 Yet these rules are best understood
not as curving exceptions for litigators and prosecutors but rather as addressing
unique aspects of these lawyers’ roles, that is, Rules 3.3 and 3.8 are simply inapplicable to other lawyers. In contrast, the proposed amendment to Rule 5.6(a)
is of a different sort. It does not impose a professional duty on in-house lawyers, rather, it accommodates their practice realities and although this exception
may be necessary to allow in-house lawyers to do their job, it nonetheless undercuts the Rules’ one-size-fits-all commitment.
Finally, addressing the practice realities of powerful lawyer-employees,
such as in-house lawyers and BigLaw associates, risks obscuring and ignoring
the needs and practice realities of weak lawyer-employees. Consider the salaries of law firm associates or the profits of equity partners. While the fees a law
firm charges each one of its clients must be reasonable per Rule 1.5(a), neither
associate salaries nor partner profits—although both are indirectly a product of
such fees—are subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Rule. As we
have seen, Rule 1.5(a) and Section 34 aim to regulate client payment for legal
services, which explain both why associate and partner pay should not be and
have not been subject to a reasonableness requirements. Clients do not pay the
salaries of associates or the profits of partners, law firms do. As long as the underlying fees each client pays are reasonable, the question of how to compensate associates and partners is conceptually a secondary inquiry that has nothing to do with clients.
Nothing is wrong with this line of reasoning, except that in dealing with
lawyer-professionals (equity partners) and once again with relatively powerful
lawyer-employees (BigLaw associates) it obscures an important question regarding weak lawyer-employees: should the Rules address the practice realities
of contract, staff and temporary lawyers? Although addressing this issue falls
outside the scope of this Article, there is no denying that the question is real
and is made more pressing by addressing the needs and practice realities of
powerful lawyer-employees, in-house attorneys.
The principal rule amendment proposed in this Article—subjecting inhouse pay to Rule 1.5(a)’s reasonableness requirement—addresses a timely issue of practical import while punting on the broader challenge of the future
regulation of different classes of lawyers by crafting rules that adhere to the
one-size-fits-all approach of the ABA. In particular, the proposed changes are
drafted to apply to powerful lawyer-employees, in-house lawyers, while not affecting the status of weak lawyer-employees, such as contract and temporary
attorneys, and the Article explicitly cautions against future mechanical application of other Rules to weak lawyer-employees. Yet such punting, which takes
for granted the one-size-fits-all regulatory approach, is admittedly a short-term
249
250
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fix. The ABA must undertake a thoughtful study of the future of attorney regulation, coming to terms with the rise of a new class of lawyer-employees and
the possibility of the demise of the idea of the One Profession.
III. IN-HOUSE PAY AS THE FAULT LINE
BETWEEN LAWYER-PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYER-BUSINESSPERSONS
Analysis of the reasonableness of in-house pay reveals the multifaceted nature of in-house lawyers’ roles and tasks. In addition to traditional legal functions, in-house lawyers perform many administrative, business and managerial
tasks, and invest ample soft hours building their human capital within the entity-client.251 The non-legal aspects of in-house lawyers’ work impact not only
the understanding of in-house pay, but also shed a light on the regulation of all
lawyers and the future of law practice.
A.The Traditional Business-Professionalism Dichotomy
For over a century now, the business-professionalism debate has been raging among lawyers and critics, centered on the question of whether the practice
of law has become a business as opposed to a profession.252 Traditionally
phrased in terms of a decline of professionalism or a paradigm shift from professionalism to a business model, commentators often assume a golden era of
professionalism that has eroded, replaced by business ethos.253 Yet the practice
of law has always been a business, at least in the sense that most lawyers, in
whatever real or imagined revered past, have practiced law for pay representing
clients’ private interests. Rather than binary opposites, law has always been a
complex tapestry, in some ways a business that has long aspired and proclaimed to be a profession, a mosaic in which business and professionalism are
but two facets of a practice in which claims of a decline mean a gradual move
toward business and away from professionalism.254
Specifically, some have argued that a modern, new breed of lawyerbusinesspersons increasingly understand their roles as client-centered service
providers who zealously pursue clients’ private interests subject only to the
law.255 Whereas in the past lawyer-professionals were willing to subject their
own self-interest to the interests of their clients, and were committed to advis251

Supra Section I.B.
See JULIUS H. COHEN, THE LAW: BUSINESS OR PROFESSION? xiv (1916); Louis D. Brandeis, Address Before the Harvard Ethical Society: The Opportunity in the Law (May 4, 1905),
in 39 AM. L. REV. 31, 555 (1905).
253 Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding Professional
Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1230
(1995).
254 See id. at 1269–70.
255 The classic account of this “Standard Conception” is William H. Simon, The Ideology of
Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29, 41–42. Simon
later dubbed this account the “Dominant View.” WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF
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ing clients to pursue their interests consistent with public interest, or, at least,
not strongly inconsistent with it, that paradigm of law practice has eroded.
Lawyer-businesspersons abandon any allegiance to the public interest and the
public good as officers of the legal system and as public citizens, unless the
public interest is defined as nothing more than an aggregate of the private interests of clients.256
Critics of this new breed of lawyers split into two camps. Some argue that
professionalism itself is a myth, a mystique, an impossibility fabricated by lawyers (and other professionals) to justify and legitimize their status, monopoly
over the provision of legal services, and noncompetitive fees. Uniting scholars
from the right and the left, the critique asserts that lawyers who advocate for
private interests for pay have no reason and will not advocate for any public interest inconsistent with their paying clients’ private interests and their own selfinterest in keeping their paying clients happy.257 The lawyer-professional was,
to these critics, more a rhetorical tool than an actual commitment, and, to the
extent that it did, at one point in time, reflect the actual beliefs and commitments of some lawyers, it has since fallen out of favor. Moreover, even if lawyers did wish, inexplicably, to advocate for a public interest different than their
own self-interest or their clients’ private interests, their public advocacy will be
undesirable turning them into lawyer-philosophers, or worse, unelected lawyerkings dominating the public discourse and interest.258 For these critics, the only
appropriate remedy for the decline of the lawyer-professional is the deprofessionalization and de-mystification of the legal profession, openly admitting that the practice of law is little more than a service industry and opening it
up to competition by nonlawyers as legal service providers.259
Other critics take a more sympathetic approach to professionalism, documenting that some lawyers, both prominent leaders of the bar and ordinary
members, used to and still do regularly act as lawyer-professionals.260 Socialized into the practice of law understood to be a profession, some lawyers manifested professionalism both by regularly moving back and forth between private and public practices,261 and by trying to persuade and influence their
clients to pursue their private interests consistent with the public interest or, at
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See Eli Wald & Russell G. Pearce, Being Good Lawyers: A Relational Approach to Law
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(1985) [hereinafter Gordon, Lawyers as the American Aristocracy]; Robert W. Gordon, The
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least, not inconsistent with the public good.262 Understanding their role to be
that of a governing class, mitigating the interests of private clients and of the
public, such lawyers routinely acted as professionals by subjecting their own
interests to those of their clients and by attempting to inform and shape their
clients’ interests in the public spirit.263 According to commentators of this persuasion, the problem with the legal profession is not that professionalism itself
is essentially a sham or a myth.264 Rather, a complex interplay of economic, political, ideological, and cultural forces has gradually turned lawyers (and their
clients) away from the vision of the lawyer-professional and toward the business pulse of the continuum, in which law is a business and lawyers serve the
private interests of clients and little (or nothing) more.265
For these critics, the move forward consists of a multipronged, timeconsuming professionalism reform agenda. It includes a redemption project,
reinventing professionalism to develop an account of it that lawyers can and
should believe in, identifying a role for lawyers as advocates of the public
good.266 It also includes an account of how such a reimagined conception of
professionalism can and ought to be adopted and championed by legal institutions, from law schools to law firms and bar associations, all engaged in efforts
to socialize and internalize professionalism as an integral constitutive part of
the practice of law.267 Finally, it includes an effort to explain how this account
of professionalism may survive inhospitable dominant economic, political, ideological, and cultural forces within and outside of the legal profession, accepted
by clients and the public at large.268
B. In-House Pay and the Rise of a New Conception of LawyerBusinesspersons
Enter in-house practice. As in-house counsel grew in influence and prestige
and their roles expanded and matured, the scholarship about in-house counsel
began to gain steam.269 An understandable tendency among scholars has been
262
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264 POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY, supra note 257, at 186.
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266 See Robert W. Gordon & William H. Simon, The Redemption of Professionalism?, in
LAWYERS’ IDEALS/LAWYERS’ PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL
PROFESSION 230–31 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992).
267 Eli Wald & Russell G. Pearce, Making Good Lawyers, 9 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 403, 429–30
(2011).
268 Russell G. Pearce & Eli Wald, The Obligation of Lawyers to Heal Civic Culture: Confronting the Ordeal of Incivility in the Practice of Law, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1,
39 (2011).
269
Supra text accompanying notes 34–40.

296

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:1

to impose and apply the traditional business-professionalism dichotomy to inhouse lawyers.270 For those calling for de-professionalization, in-house practice
constitutes a stark example of the fallacy of the lawyer-professional ideal: inhouse lawyers serve the private interests of the entity-client and only those interests. To expect them to pursue any other interests, let alone some abstract
and often poorly articulated version of the public good, is to misunderstand
what in-house lawyers, and indeed, what all lawyers do, and to fall victim to
the mystique of professionalism. In-house lawyers cannot, do not, and should
not pursue any interest other than those of the entity-client subject only to the
law. They are, and they reveal, the true face of all members of the bar as lawyer-businesspersons.271
For those who believe in the possibility of the revival of the lawyerprofessional, in-house counsel represent a tough challenge. Embedded within
their clients and lacking independence, in-house lawyers may find it incredibly
hard to practice as lawyer-professionals, even if a viable, credible account of
professionalism were to emerge. Thus, attempts by leading in-house counsel to
portray themselves as the new lawyer-statespersons who act as the moral conscience of the entity-client are not outright rejected but are taken with a grain of
salt.272
The in-house pay analysis reveals, however, a new perspective. It shows
that in-house practice does not fit into the “de-professionalize” or the “redemption” paradigms. Rather, it exposes a new friction or a new fault line in the
business-profession dichotomy. Within the confines of the traditional businessprofession debate, it has always been understood and assumed that the practice
of law as such had real, well-defined content such that the disagreement was
not whether the practice of law existed but rather whether it was (more of) a
profession or a business.
To be sure, the assumption of law practice as a real meaningful concept
was neither jurisprudentially naïve nor simplistic. Assuming law has discernable identifiable qualities, to allow one to debate whether it is a profession or a
business, does not entail a retreat to Formalism. Post Realism, hardly any lawyer reasonably believes law is an independent, self-contained body of esoteric
knowledge.273 Of course law is more than a body of statutes, case law and doc270
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trine. It is also what the judge (and legislator, and lawyer, and client) had for
breakfast, shaped and informed by, while shaping and informing, politics and
culture, intersecting with bodies of knowledge as diverse as economics (of the
client, of the lawyer and at large), history, sociology, anthropology, and psychology, not to mention literature, feminism, race relations, and queer studies.274
At the same time, however, law was assumed to have a core, an essence,
which was unique and discernable.275 Karl Llewellyn has taught us all that to be
an effective lawyer one has to be interdisciplinary.276 For example, to understand the client’s objectives a lawyer has to be a part-time economist and psychologist, and to effectively serve the client’s interests one has to understand
jury selection processes and states of mind, be mindful of judges’ moods, and
master public relations and the manipulation of the court of public opinion.277
But, importantly, all of these bodies of knowledge and expertise were at the
service of a legal core. When representing a client in litigation, a lawyer practiced “law” when she drafted a complaint (or an answer), filed various additional pleadings, negotiated a settlement in the shadow of trial, prepared for trial and litigated it. When representing a client in a transaction, a lawyer
practiced “law” when she converted term sheets into legal documents, translated business risks into legal risks, negotiated the various aspects of the deal, and
helped close it. In this sense, assuming the existence of the practice of law, assuming that there was a “there” there,278 was not naïve. Rather, it assumed the
existence of a legal core, which was the practice of law, even as it was inherently interwoven into other bodies of peripheral knowledge.
Similarly, the assumption of law in the business-profession debate was not
simplistic, acknowledging the many business facets of law practice above and
beyond the important observation that most lawyers run a business in the sense
that they charge fees for the services they provide and in that they pay their
employees, for office space and for expenses related to the practice of law with
the intent to make a profit. Consider a BigLaw partner engaged in non-billable
business-development (Biz-Dev) activities. Biz-Dev has become a meaningful
aspect of BigLaw partners’ professional lives, an integral and significant part of
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what they, or at least, what successful equity partners do.279 As important as
Biz-Dev is, however, it is adjunct to and in the service of the practice of law as
a distinct core separate from business. Biz-Dev is pursued not as an end-on-toitself but to allow the partner to then practice law. Indeed, even relationship
rain-making partners who engage near-exclusively in Biz-Dev and hardly practice law (increasingly a rarity in a world in which powerful general counsel refuse to pay for associates’ time and expect the partners to actually do the work,
that is, practice law),280 do so to identify and generate work for their team
members who will mine the relationships for legal billable work.281 In other
words, to belittle the importance and relevance of Biz-Dev to the practice of
BigLaw’s equity partners is to misunderstand their practice of law, at the same
time as Biz-Dev is fundamentally secondary to and in the service of a core of
law practice.
In-house practice and in-house pay challenge the core of law practice.
Some in-house lawyers, namely powerful general counsel who often also serve
as chief legal officers or who are otherwise members of the entity-client’s management team, do not practice law as the core of what they do. Rather, at the
core of what they do is business management and leadership, informed by their
knowledge and mastery of the law. No doubt, at times these general counsel act
as “cops,” primarily acting as lawyers for the entity in the traditional legal
sense.282 Fundamentally, however, at other, perhaps most times, acting as
“counsel” and as “business leaders,” these general counsel are practicing business, not law.283 They are not lawyer-professionals but rather lawyerbusinesspersons, and in acting as lawyer-businesspersons they threaten, move
away from, and change the meaning of the core of law in the “practice of law”
not only for themselves but for all lawyers in the legal profession.
One may retort that general counsel as lawyer-businesspersons do not challenge the meaning of the practice of law any more than a near-exclusively relational equity partner at BigLaw does. The argument might proceed as follows:
most lawyers (and nonlawyers) at BigLaw practice law and support it, and the
279
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very Biz-Dev activities of relational equity partners are geared toward generating legal work for others engaged in the practice of law. Similarly, even if
powerful general counsel do not primarily practice law, their business practice
depends on and is adjacent to the work of all lawyers in the in-house legal department and outside of it throughout the entity-client, who do practice law in
the more traditional, core, sense.
On closer reflection, however, this argument fails. General counsel’s role
as lawyer-businesspersons is not secondary to, or in the service of, the work of
lawyers in and outside of the in-house department. Quite the contrary, general
counsel’s work is in the service of the business management of the entityclient. It does not depend on the work of lawyers in the in-house legal department in the symbiotic manner in which Biz-Dev depends on lawyers to mine
the legal work. Rather, the entire orientation of general counsel’s work is business, not law, with a typical promotion being an advancement into the C-Suite
for a nonlegal position.284
In-house pay captures this challenge to the core of law practice. Suppose
the Rules were amended (or interpreted) to impose a reasonableness requirement on in-house pay. Could entity-clients bypass the requirement by bifurcating a general counsel’s compensation package, paying a reasonable pay for legal services rendered, and an “unreasonable” pay or, at least, a second payment
not subject to a reasonableness requirement, for business services rendered?
Relatedly, to bypass the prohibition in the Rules against noncompetes, can entity-clients grant their in-house lawyers stock and stock options subject to a noncompete provision for their business, as opposed to legal, services?285
The Rules answer these questions with an impassioned “no.” Rule 5.7(b)
states that “[t]he term ‘law-related services’ denotes services that might reasonably be performed in conjunction with and in substance are related to the provision of legal services, and that are not prohibited as unauthorized practice of
law when provided by a nonlawyer,”286 a definition that perfectly describes the
business work of in-house counsel. Rule 5.7(a)(1) then states in relevant part
that “[a] lawyer shall be subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct with respect to the provision of law-related services, as defined in paragraph (b), if the
law-related services are provided [] by the lawyer in circumstances that are not
distinct from the lawyer’s provision of legal services to clients.”287 Accordingly, in-house practice is subject to the Rules, including Rules 1.5(a) and 5.6(a),
because pursuant to Rule 5.7 the business practice of in-house lawyers is inseparable from their practice of law, even if it dominates and undercuts the core
practice of “law” in its traditional sense.
The Rules’ statutory answer is echoed by leading elite general counsel. Ben
Heineman and Norman Veasey, for example, insist that law practice and legal
284
285
286
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identity are inherent to the ability of in-house lawyers to act as guardians and
the conscience of their entity-clients. Divorcing the legal from the non-legal aspects of what in-house lawyers do would pull the rug from under the ability of
these lawyers to perform their jobs well.288
The Rules’ clear-cut stance, however, does little more than reveal the profession’s anxiety over the potential sea of change it is facing. The profession, or
at least, its elite leaders, would like to adhere to the old ideal of the lawyerprofessional and reject its threatening and unknown counterpart, the lawyerbusinessperson. The lawyer-businessperson, by practicing law and business as
equal parts or worse, by subjecting law to business, undermines the core of law
as a distinctive practice. As such, the practice of law by lawyer-businesspersons
opens the door to the discussion the profession has long been able to avoid
about what is, and is not, the practice of law for purposes of the regulation of
law, legal providers, and the monopoly over the provision of legal services.289
In the short run, the Rules can be amended or interpreted to impose a reasonableness requirement on in-house pay,290 and Rule 5.7(a)(1) can continue to
provide that in-house practice is either the practice of law or a mix of law and
“law-related services,” subject to the Rules.291 In the long run, however, the
profession will be foolish to ignore and deny the fundamental questions and
challenges raised by in-house practice and in-house pay. In-house lawyers are
lawyer-employees, not lawyer-professionals, and regulation of their roles requires coming to terms with the rise of the lawyer-employee as a challenge to
the centuries-old dominant paradigm of the lawyer-professional. Some in-house
lawyers are also lawyer-businesspersons, not lawyer-professionals, and their
practice and applicable rules of conduct must reflect a reckoning with the challenges posed by the lawyer-businessperson to the lawyer-professional ideal.
CONCLUSION
The regulation of in-house pay, namely, whether in-house salaries, bonuses, stock grants, stock options, and nonmonetary benefits are subject to a reasonableness requirement, and if so, what reasonableness means in this context,
presents complex questions of statutory interpretation. Answering these questions requires exploring the plain language meaning of various statutory provisions, as well as examining their various policy rationales and objectives. As it
turns out, however, the best interpretation of the Rules, pursuant to which inhouse pay must be reasonable, is but the tip of an iceberg. The questions sur288
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rounding in-house pay reveal and demonstrate fundamental changes in the
practice of law: the decline of the lawyer-professional paradigm and the rise of
two distinct but sometimes intersecting alternatives, the lawyer-employee and
the lawyer-businessperson. These new paradigms require a close examination
of not only particular rules of professional conduct and the entire regulatory
approach to the practice of law and the provision of legal services, but also of
the role of lawyers and the meaning of law. This is an important and timely undertaking, in which this Article constitutes but the first step.
Moreover, the decline of the lawyer-professional and the rise of the lawyeremployee and the lawyer-businessperson have important consequences outside
of the law, far beyond understanding changes to the historical roles of lawyerprofessionals as representatives of clients, officers of the legal system and public citizens.292 Consider this opening shot: U.S. corporate law has long regulated executive compensation as a matter of the duty of care subject to the presumption of the Business Judgment Rule of corporate agents.293 Executive
compensation is immune from substantive judicial scrutiny as long as the decision-makers who set the compensation have done so on an informed basis,
leading courts to defer to their business judgment and expertise.294 If, however,
in-house pay is subject to a reasonableness requirement, and if, as explained in
this Article, the rationale for imposing such a requirement is in part a fiduciary
duty owed by in-house lawyers as fiduciaries to their entity-clients to abstain
from “taking undue advantage” of the entity-clients “in direct dealings between
them,”295 then the regulation of in-house pay and of in-house lawyers as fiduciaries suggests a new way to think about executive compensation and the regulation of corporate agents more broadly. Perhaps U.S. corporate law has been
wrong to focus on those who make executive compensation decisions and
whether they were informed in making their decisions, and instead ought to focus, learning from in-house lawyers and the regulation of in-house pay, on
those who receive executive compensation. If in-house pay is subject to an objective and substantive reasonableness requirement because the lawyers who
receive it are fiduciaries of entity-clients who cannot receive unreasonable pay,
could not executive compensation be subject to an objective and substantive
reasonableness requirement because the executives who receive it (as opposed
to those who make the decisions about it) are fiduciaries of entities who cannot
receive unreasonable pay?
The legal profession must promptly begin an earnest and meaningful conversation about the rise of a class of lawyer-employees within its midst and the
rise of a lawyer-businessperson paradigm alongside its traditional lawyer292

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Preamble, cmt. 1 (stating “[a] lawyer, as a member
of the legal profession, is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice.”).
293 Supra text accompanying notes 158–64.
294 Supra text accompanying notes 158–64.
295 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43, cmt. e (AM. LAW
INST. 2011); see also supra Section I.A.2.d.
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professional ideal. Nonlawyers should pay close attention and participate in this
conversation not only as clients and as potential competitors, but as stakeholders and parties in a broader exchange about the meaning of fiduciary duties and
their interaction with market controls.
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APPENDIX A–PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE ABA MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
The proposed revisions to the Rules are italicized.
In-house pay as “fee”: Rule 1.5 (a) and the Comment to Rule 1.5, or a new
subsection in Rule 1.0(x).
1.5(a) “A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or compensation or an unreasonable amount for expenses.”
[1] “Paragraph (a) requires that lawyers charge fees and forms of compensation that are reasonable under the circumstances. The reasonableness requirement applies to the compensation of in-house lawyers.”
In the alternative, the ABA can leave Rule 1.5(a) and comment 1 intact and
add to its terminology section, Rule 1.0, a new definition as follows:
1.0(x) “Fee” denotes the payment for legal services provided by a lawyer
to a client, including payment by an organizational client to its in-house counsel in the form of salaries, bonuses, or nonmonetary benefits.
Noncompete and stocks grants and options: Rule 5.6(a).
5.6 A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making:
(a) a partnership, shareholders, operating, employment, or other similar
type of agreement that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship, except an agreement concerning benefits upon retirement or an agreement concerning the grant of stock grants or stock options to
in-house counsel as part of a compensation agreement subject to a reasonable
noncompete provision.
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